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PRECEDENT IN STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION* 
LAWRENCE M. SOLAN** 
In interpreting statutes, judges frequently refer to their obligation 
to avoid substituting their own policy preferences for those of the 
legislature. This principle, “legislative primacy,” has been the 
most significant motivation for the movement against the use of 
such extrinsic evidence of legislative intent as a statute’s 
legislative history. This history is not enacted and can be cherry-
picked by judges or anyone else wishing to create a narrative that 
favors one side or the other. 
This Article addresses another source of evidence that is not 
enacted and is subject to selective citation: judicial decisions. U.S. 
judges are relentless in citing each other as reasons for deciding 
statutory cases. On occasion, citations demonstrate that the issue 
before the court has already been decided. Most of the time, 
however, courts cite each other to demonstrate coherence with a 
legal narrative, whether the law’s enactment history, the social 
history surrounding its enactment, the courts’ jurisprudence 
concerning other issues involving that statute, or the relationship 
between the law in question and the corpus juris. Also included 
are citations to other cases that have employed the various 
canons of construction and even cases that have applied everyday 
language one way or another. 
The goal of this Article is to evaluate these references in terms of 
which ones legitimately advance rule of law values. It does so by 
examining one five-to-three and two five-to-four United States 
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Supreme Court decisions in detail. Some citation practices, it 
argues, should be eliminated altogether. Others are legitimate if 
justified by analogical reasoning. Still others are legitimate as is. 
The Article further addresses the extent to which the use of 
citation is a by-product of common law reasoning infiltrating the 
statute-based legal system in which we now live. 
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But though I have no quarrel with the common law and its 
process, I do question whether the attitude of the common-law 
process judge—the mind-set that asks, “What is the most 
desirable resolution of this case, and how can any impediments 
to the achievement of that result be evaded?”—is appropriate for 
most of the work that I do, and much of the work that state 
judges do. We live in an age of legislation, and most new law is 
statutory law. 
   —Justice Antonin Scalia1 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Scalia was entirely right. We do indeed live in an age of 
statutes, with a judiciary of common law judges.2 And in their role as 
statutory interpreters, judges, at least in principle, have less discretion 
than they do as the developers of the common law. Aware of this 
limitation, judges recognize the need to constrain themselves in 
statutory cases, reminding themselves and their readers of their 
proper role, which is subordinated to enforcing the decisions that the 
legislature has already made in enacting the statute under 
consideration. Thus, judges have frequently commented on their 
obligation not to substitute their own values for the decision of the 
legislature but rather to enforce the legislative will.3 
Much of the discussion about judicial restraint in statutory cases 
has centered on the legitimacy of relying upon inferences of 
legislative intent4 and the dangers of considering the purpose of a law, 
except to the extent that the purpose can be inferred from the 
 
 1. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 13 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 2. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5–6 
(1982); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479, 495–
97 (2013). 
 3. See, e.g., H. J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 246 (1989); FTC v. Cement 
Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 738 (1948) (quoting Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. FTC, 157 F.2d 533, 
573 (7th Cir. 1946) (Burton, J., dissenting) (“We know of no criticism so often and so 
forcibly directed at courts, particularly Federal courts, as their propensity for usurping the 
functions of Congress.”)). 
 4. RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 3 (2012); ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION 87, 198–202 (2006); Scalia, supra note 1, at 16–18; John F. Manning, 
Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 427–39 (2005). 
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language of the statute itself.5 Scalia himself argued that this lack of 
discipline is the result of common law judges failing to recognize that 
they now live in a statutory world that more resembles a civil law 
system.6 
This Article does not further the debate over those issues but 
rather adds another consideration: the use of precedent.7 It is the 
unconstrained reliance on precedent—rather than the consideration 
of purpose or intent—that distinguishes how common law and civil 
law judges interpret statutes. In fact, civil law judges generally apply a 
purposive approach to statutory interpretation—“teleological 
interpretation”—tempered by limitations in the statutory language.8 
That is, they regard their obligation as furthering the purpose of the 
statute without doing so to such an extent as to nullify the statutory 
language. Legislative intent, including intent gleaned from a review of 
both enactment history and context surrounding the enactment, is 
also fair game.9 For the most part, such principles of interpretation in 
civil law jurisdictions are found in treatises, but in some instances, 
they are codified. The Spanish Civil Code, for example, structures 
interpretation as follows: 
Rules shall be construed according to the proper meaning of 
their wording and in connection with the context, with their 
historical and legislative background and with the social reality 
of the time in which they are to be applied, mainly attending to 
their spirit and purpose.10 
 
 5. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 20 (2012). For an excellent discussion of the 
purposive method in the U.S. courts, see Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: 
Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 
GEO. L.J. 1119, 1147–53 (2011). 
 6. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 13–14. 
 7. I note, though, that I have taken an intentionalist position on these issues 
elsewhere. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR 
INTERPRETATION (2010). In particular, see chapters three and four. 
 8. See, e.g., REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LEGAL METHODS 
69–72 (Kirk W. Junker & P. Matthew Roy trans., 10th ed. 2006). 
 9. See id. at 70–71; Holger Fleischer, Comparative Approaches to the Use of 
Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 401, 408–09 (2012) 
(writing of German practice: “No one today argues for a ‘strict’ objective theory 
proscribing the use of legislative history, just as no one supports a ‘pure’ subjective theory 
which would forever bind the interpreter to historical legislative intent”).  
 10. C.C., ch. 2, art. III (1889) (Spain). A translation is available at Spain, WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=221319 [https://perma
.cc/3SJH-VYW5]. 
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Other civil law legal systems make similar use of legislative history 
and purposive interpretation.11 Moreover, the plain meaning rule 
plays a more subordinate role in civil law systems.12 Thus, it may be 
too simplistic to say that when American judges consider legislative 
history or statutory purpose they fail to escape their common law 
orientation—after all, civil law judges follow a similar approach to 
statutory interpretation. 
On the other hand, American judges are unrelenting in their 
citation of earlier decisions as a reason to construe a statute one way 
or the other. Civil law judges are generally not wedded to this 
approach. Moreover, while the selective use of legislative history in 
American courts has been a subject of concern to judges and 
commentators alike,13 the selective use by judges of judicial precedent 
in statutory cases has received less attention. 
Recent scholarship on the interpretation of statutes by state 
courts suggests that the propensity of the federal courts—the 
Supreme Court in particular—to rely so much on their own words and 
so little on those of the legislature is all the more remarkable.14 
Relatively little of the federal judiciary’s work is common law based, 
at least not in the traditional sense of common law.15 Yet, when 
federal judges interpret statutes, the opinions often assume the tone 
and argument structure of common law judges, relying on case law as 
a principal form of argumentation. 
 
 11. See, e.g., Michel Troper, Christophe Grzegorczyk & Jean-Louis Gardies, Statutory 
Interpretation in France, in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 171, 183–
85 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991) [hereinafter INTERPRETING 
STATUTES]. 
 12. See Konrad Zweigert & Hans-Jürgen Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation—
Civilian Style, 44 TUL. L. REV. 704, 713 (1970) (“Even the most authoritative, and, with 
due respect, most conservative treatise on German civil law gives a strongly worded 
warning against applying the plain meaning rule. However, in practice it does reappear 
now and then, and when it does, it usually meets with severe criticism.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
 13. The most famous statement comes from Justice Scalia’s quotation of Judge 
Leventhal saying that combing through legislative history for support is “the equivalent of 
entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one’s 
friends.” Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). I argue here 
that if legislative history comes from choosing friends at a cocktail party, citation of case 
precedent comes from a president choosing among friends at an inaugural ball. 
 14. See Pojanowski, supra note 2, at 480. 
 15. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 13. See generally EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO LEGAL REASONING (1948) (describing this view, which makes much more of 
distinctions among holding, dicta, and justificatory argument than do contemporary 
American courts). 
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There has, indeed, been general debate about the role that the 
common law tradition should play in statutory interpretation. On one 
side, commentators and jurists including the late Justice Scalia argue 
that when judges sit as interpreters of statutes they should shed their 
common law mantles, take a back seat, and acknowledge the primacy 
of the legislature. This, the argument goes, requires courts to do less 
searching for the “best” interpretation based on considerations 
outside the legislation and to pay more attention to the text itself.16 A 
recent article by Jeffrey Pojanowski17 summarizes this discussion, with 
scholars such as Professors John Manning18 and Adrian Vermeule19 
joining Scalia in warning against overreliance on common law 
reasoning. Judge Frank Easterbrook has similarly called for judges to 
stand back from their common law inclinations in statutory cases.20 
On the other side, writers including Professor William Eskridge,21 
Judge Guido Calabresi,22 and Professor Peter Strauss23 argue that 
embedding statutory interpretation into a larger framework that 
includes common law reasoning creates a balance between stability 
and dynamism that is appropriate for judicial decision-making. 
Despite the sometimes vituperative debates over interpretive 
methods, judges from both camps rely on precedent to expand or 
contract their arsenal of interpretive tools. This ubiquity of precedent 
on both ends of the spectrum should not come as a surprise. 
Adherence to precedent furthers both uniformity and stability in the 
 
 16. Scalia, supra note 1, at 17. 
 17. Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reading Statutes in the Common Law Tradition, 101 VA. L. 
REV. 1357, 1374–75 (2015). 
 18. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 4, at 450; John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390 (2003). 
 19. Adrian Vermeule objects to courts’ use of canons of construction, since they are 
virtually all judicial constructs and judges are generally less competent than agencies to 
make interpretive decisions. See VERMEULE, supra note 4, at 200–02. 
 20. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983). 
 21. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 107–
09 (1994) (arguing that judges should take into account reliance on earlier judicial 
decisions, among other changes in the legal landscape, in subsequent interpretations of a 
statute). 
 22. See CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 101 (1982) (arguing, as the title suggests, for 
judges to have the power to modify statutory language over time as language evolves and 
social context develops). 
 23. See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 
242–45 (1999) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law and Statutes] (establishing a common 
law perspective on both legislating and interpreting legislation in the United States); Peter 
L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 
429, 436–37 (1994). 
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law—important rule of law values.24 And, compared with reliance on 
precedent in constitutional cases, reliance on statutory precedent 
produces less long-term risk. When a court makes a decision contrary 
to the intent of the legislature or contrary to values the legislature 
now cherishes, regardless of the intent of an earlier, enacting 
legislature, the legislature can override the court’s decision and regain 
control of the statute’s application.25 
Cutting across the various ways in which courts use judicial 
precedent in statutory cases, this Article looks at its use as a 
phenomenon in its own right. Indeed, specific judicial practices that 
rely on precedent have received attention. One such practice is the 
use of statutory stare decisis. Courts generally regard prior 
interpretations of a law as settled and do not review them. When they 
do review such precedent, they most often reaffirm earlier decisions 
as entrenched, whether they would be the best decisions today or, for 
that matter, were good decisions when initially made. In particular, a 
high court is unlikely to reverse itself once it has ruled on a question 
of statutory interpretation.26 Similarly, there has been substantial 
discussion of the role that canons of construction should play in 
judicial interpretation of statutes.27 Yet these—substantive and 
 
 24. These values are frequently articulated as motivation for legal decision-making. 
See, e.g., Margaret N. Kniffin, Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action 
by United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 80–88 (1982). 
 25. For discussion of the actual practice of overriding judicial interpretations of 
statutes, see generally Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional 
Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 1317, 1319–20 (2014) (surveying congressional overrides during that period and 
noting a shift from “restorative overrides” to “policy-updating” overrides); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 
331, 334 (1991) (surveying congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory 
interpretation cases and positing that “statutory interpretation decisions are more 
responsive to the expectations of the current Congress than to those of the enacting 
Congress,” but that “the Court is also responsive to its own institutional and personal 
preferences”); Victoria F. Nourse, Overrides: The Super-Study, 92 TEX. L. REV. 205 (2014) 
(commenting on Christiansen and Eskridge’s 2014 survey); Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow 
Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional 
Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 512 (2009) (arguing that congressional overrides 
of Supreme Court statutory interpretation precedents are often construed narrowly, which 
“threatens legislative supremacy and undermines the standard rationales offered for 
adherence to precedent”). 
 26. William Eskridge has referred to this phenomenon as “super-strong” stare decisis. 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988). 
 27. The seminal, critical work is Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of 
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 
VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). Since then, there have been many positions taken on both the 
role of the canons generally and on the status of particular canons. For an excellent 
empirical study of the battles over the application of many of the canons, see Anita 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1165 (2016) 
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grammatical canons alike—may also be seen as instances of judges 
acting authoritatively in a realm in which they profess to be 
subordinate. 
Adherence to earlier interpretations of the same statute by a 
high court and reliance on the canons of construction are only the tip 
of the iceberg when it comes to reliance on precedent in statutory 
cases. Judges, in particular Supreme Court Justices, often rely on 
earlier judicial statements to justify just about every aspect of every 
argument in every case, from how a court construed a word of 
ordinary English decades ago to the assessment of historical fact set 
forth in an earlier case. Furthermore, such reliance is neither limited 
to nor more prominent among the more liberal, nontextualist 
judges.28 All judges do it. While legal scholars and judges express 
concern about the judiciary overstepping its proper role by inserting 
judges’ own values into the interpretation of a statute, absent from 
this discussion is a consideration of the vast extent to which courts 
rely upon their own judicial opinions in ruling on the meaning and 
application of laws. 
This Article examines every precedent cited by Supreme Court 
Justices in one five-to-three decision and two five-to-four decisions 
dealing with statutory interpretation. What emerges is a picture of 
indiscriminate citation to judicial authority. The overarching goal of 
this methodology, I argue, is the quest for coherence. Judges care 
about demonstrating that one interpretation fits better with past 
practice than competing interpretations. Regardless of whether a 
current decision coheres with the social or political context 
surrounding a law’s enactment, the statute’s legislative history, its 
interpretation by prior courts, judicial interpretation of other statutes, 
the use of various interpretive principles, or other considerations, 
judges appear to concern themselves with demonstrating that their 
interpretation advances a narrative that is indisputably part of the 
American legal tradition.29 However, because the narratives with 
 
Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909 (2016); see also ROBERT A. 
KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 51–54 (2014); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS 
OF JURISPRUDENCE 279–80, 282 (1990); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, at 51 (setting 
forth fifty-seven “valid” canons of interpretation); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, 
Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 
1–7 (2005); Michael Sinclair, “Only a Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling 
Canons,” One to Seven, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 919, 919–21 (2006). 
 28. See infra Section II.B. 
 29. The narrative structure of legal decision-making has been widely discussed. For a 
seminal work, see generally ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING 
THE LAW (2000). 
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which a decision may cohere are many, the use of precedent in the 
service of these arguments is largely unconstrained. 
It is easy enough to criticize this practice—and this Article does 
criticize it. Reliance upon random statements by a judge in an 
unrelated case; excessive reliance on grammatical canons of 
construction in the teeth of equally available argument to the 
contrary; the use of precedent to establish the meaning of an 
everyday word that has no fixed legal meaning; and the 
“textualization” of earlier precedent30—replacing statutory language 
with the language used by judges who had earlier written about the 
statute—are all questionable practices. Moreover, such practices 
undermine the principle of legislative primacy because they are either 
based upon false assumptions about the legislative process31 or do not 
concern themselves with the legislative process at all. Instead, they 
place the judiciary at the center of the interpretive endeavor. 
Yet legitimate reasons for referring to earlier decisions do exist. 
Among them are the practice of statutory stare decisis mentioned 
above; the establishment of certain canons of construction32 
embodying generally accepted principles of statutory interpretation 
(albeit judge-made principles); and the desire to create a coherent 
body of law around language that is not sufficiently crisp to apply 
uniformly without further interpretation. By distinguishing legitimate 
and indiscriminate reliance on statutory precedent, this Article 
attempts to separate the wheat from the chaff—or at least begin to do 
so. 
Part I briefly describes statutory stare decisis. Because this 
Article supports this doctrine, the discussion serves as a baseline for 
the more critical analysis of other applications of interpretation by 
precedent. It should be noted at the outset, however, that stare decisis 
is the quintessential principle of common law adjudication and is, for 
the most part, in tension with legislative primacy.33 Its wide 
acceptance in the realm of statutory interpretation speaks volumes 
about the relationship between legislature and judiciary. 
 
 30. The expression comes from Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1188 (2007). 
 31. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 928–30 (2013) (summarizing the results of an empirical study). 
 32. These largely include the substantive canons, such as the presumption that laws 
are intended to apply within the territory and not in foreign domains. 
 33. See infra Section I.A. 
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Part II discusses more fully the range of reasons for employing 
precedent as a method in statutory interpretation. In some ways this 
method reinforces the core value of legislative primacy, while in other 
ways it undermines that value. This Part then examines in detail the 
use of precedent in one five-to-three and two five-to-four statutory 
interpretation decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court,34 each of which 
involves the interpretation of a linguistically ambiguous statute, 
requiring arguments beyond the law’s plain language. The analysis 
examines every citation to a judicial opinion in each case, in one 
instance numbering almost one hundred. The conclusions drawn from 
that analysis paint a chaotic picture of how judges use precedent. In 
some cases, the Justices engage one another, both sides arguing about 
the same thing but disagreeing on the outcome. In other cases, the 
two sides refer to distinct bodies of precedent, like ships passing in the 
night. Sometimes Justices recognize that the case law does not give 
rise to a single answer. On other occasions, a Justice might cite only 
those precedents that support his or her position, either relying on the 
other side to bring out opposing precedent or simply appearing 
unconcerned about whether anyone notices. 
Part II continues by comparing the conclusions drawn from these 
case analyses to the baseline principles articulated in the discussion of 
stare decisis in Part I. Precedent is used for stare decisis effect when 
the case is said to resemble an earlier decision that has already 
decided the issue at hand. As Part III reveals, however, precedent is 
also used to support a host of arguments, ranging from establishing 
the meanings of commonly used words, to the application of 
grammatical and substantive canons of construction, and, perhaps 
most interestingly, to the creation of narratives based on earlier 
holdings in an effort to demonstrate that a Justice’s position better 
coheres with past practice than the opposing position. 
Part III focuses on the judicial values of stability and coherence 
as explanations for courts’ heavy reliance on precedent in statutory 
decisions.35 Significantly, these values are prominent in both common 
 
 34. The cases are: Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005); Ledbetter v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007); and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 
105 (2001). 
 35. These values are frequently articulated as justification for a high court’s issuing 
decisions that have binding precedential effect. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, On 
Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 730 
(2012) (“Having the final say entrenches the Court’s role of helping to ensure stability, 
coherence, and unity in the legal system, a role that the Court has claimed (sometimes 
unsuccessfully) from the beginning.”). 
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law and civil law theory.36 For this reason, it would be a mistake to 
characterize the use of precedent in furtherance of these values as an 
instance of judges being unable to free themselves from their 
common law constraints in statutory cases. Rather, Part III posits that 
it makes more sense both to understand stability and coherence as 
general rule of law values, promoted in common law style, and to 
examine the extent to which comfort with precedent leads judges to 
extend their use of precedent in ways that cannot be justified by these 
values. 
Part IV presents an approach to the use of precedent in statutory 
cases that begins by taking greater advantage of the traditional 
distinction between holdings and dicta to sort out what precedent 
must be adhered to and what is worth following only because it is 
persuasive. While the distinction has been rightly criticized as difficult 
to apply in some contexts, it can serve as a starting point in helping 
judges and lawyers conceptually separate precedent that must be 
followed from that which might be followed, if persuasive. In the 
service of deference to the legislature, Part IV argues that judges 
should justify reference to the persuasive precedent on substantive 
grounds, rather than merely on the basis of its having been previously 
said. In some ways, the distinction suggested here, while a 
foundational part of traditional common law reasoning, better 
resembles the approach to statutory cases used in many civil law 
jurisdictions, where legislative primacy is considered the norm and 
precedent is valued far less as a part of legal argument. Part IV then 
offers specific suggestions for implementing the approach presented, 
including the maintenance of statutory stare decisis and reduced 
deference to various canons of construction. 
I.  STATUTORY STARE DECISIS: STABILITY IN THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LAWS 
A. The Propensity Not to Overrule Statutory Decisions 
Often called “statutory stare decisis,” the principle that 
precedents in statutory cases are not to be overturned lightly is 
justified on several grounds.37 Chief among these justifications is the 
 
 36. See Strauss, Common Law and Statutes, supra note 23, at 234–36 for a discussion 
of similarities and differences between the two types of systems with regard to statutory 
interpretation. 
 37. The term “stare decisis” is used in this context to refer to what Frederick Schauer 
calls “horizontal precedent,” the practice of a court’s adhering to earlier decisions even if 
it disagrees with them, for the sake of continuity and stability. See Frederick Schauer, 
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benefit that comes from knowing that the meaning of a statute is 
settled, and thus that its interpretation can be relied on by those to 
whom the statute applies. As Justice Brandeis once explained: 
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters 
it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled 
than that it be settled right. This is commonly true even where 
the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can 
be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal 
Constitution, where correction through legislative action is 
practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier 
decisions.38 
Brandeis articulates the standard account: stare decisis should be 
especially strong in statutory cases and especially weak in 
constitutional cases, with, supposedly, a middle ground in common 
law adjudication.39 
But this stance is not without its detractors. For instance, 
Professor Amy Coney Barrett, in an article criticizing lower courts for 
adopting the doctrine, focuses on two widely discussed justifications 
for statutory stare decisis: legislative acquiescence to the court’s 
decision and separation of powers concerns, which make it more 
appropriate for the legislature than the court to alter policy in the 
wake of a court’s erroneous interpretive decision.40 Inferences of 
legislative agreement based on the legislature’s failure to override an 
earlier court decision have been criticized widely.41 There are many 
reasons for a legislature not to act, only one of which is majority 
 
Precedent, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 123, 124 
(Andrei Marmor ed., 2012). “Vertical precedent,” in contrast, refers to the obligation of 
lower courts to follow the precedents set by higher courts. Id. I return to the latter concept 
below. 
 38. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 39. See generally, e.g., Brian C. Kalt, Three Levels of Stare Decisis: Distinguishing 
Common-Law, Constitutional, and Statutory Cases, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 277 (2004) 
(articulating this account and calling for greater adherence to precedent in constitutional 
and common law cases). 
 40. Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 317, 330–37 (2005). 
 41. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2053 (2014) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“Giving dispositive weight to congressional silence regarding a common-
law decision of this Court effectively codifies that decision based only on Congress’ failure 
to address it. This approach is at odds with our Constitution’s requirements for enacting 
law.”); Paul Stancil, Congressional Silence and the Statutory Interpretation Game, 54 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1251, 1252–54 (2013). For earlier discussion of the doctrine, see 
generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 
(1988). 
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acquiescence to a court’s earlier interpretive decision.42 Moreover, 
such acquiescence, when it does occur, says nothing about whether 
the enacting legislature would have been pleased with how the 
judiciary applied its work.43 
More persuasive is the separation of powers rationale for the 
doctrine, attributable in different versions to Justice Hugo Black44 
and, more recently, Professor Lawrence Marshall.45 Justice Black first 
recognized that courts must resolve ambiguities in statutes even when 
such resolution is inseparable from a policy decision that, in an ideal 
world, would have been the legislature’s to make.46 But he further 
argued that nothing excuses a court’s revisiting its initial decision to 
create new policy later: 
When the law has been settled by an earlier case[,] then any 
subsequent “reinterpretation” of the statute is gratuitous and 
neither more nor less than an amendment: it is no different 
from a judicial alteration of language that Congress itself placed 
in the statute. 
Altering the important provisions of a statute is a 
legislative function. And the Constitution states simply and 
unequivocally: “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States	.	.	.	.”47 
Professor Marshall, expressing similar concerns, argues that imposing 
a rule of absolute statutory stare decisis is the best way to discipline 
both the courts (not to make legislative decisions beyond what is 
necessary under their Article III obligations) and the legislature (to 
override judicial decisions with which they disagree instead of waiting 
for the courts to do the work for them).48 
Yet, this bright-line argument fails to consider that statutory 
stare decisis is not a norm set in stone. As William Eskridge has 
pointed out, situations exist in which courts are less likely to give 
deference to earlier statutory decisions.49 First, as Justice Frankfurter 
advocated, in some instances statutory precedents arise casually, 
 
 42. See Barrett, supra note 40, at 334. 
 43. See id. 
 44. Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 256–57 (1970) 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
 45. Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of 
Statutory Stare Decisis, 87 MICH. L. REV. 177, 182–83 (1989). 
 46. See Boys Mkts., Inc., 398 U.S. at 256–58 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. at 257–58 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I). 
 48. See Marshall, supra note 45, at 183. 
 49. ESKRIDGE, supra note 21, at 252–57. 
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without sufficient analysis.50 When that happens, further reflection 
may lead courts to change their minds. Second, as many have 
observed, some statutes are considered “common law statutes” whose 
doctrines develop over time through judicial decision-making.51 
Finally, as Eskridge points out, the less reliance there has been on a 
precedent, the less problematic would be its reversal for good cause.52 
These various factors play out in the two illustrations presented 
below. 
B. Two Scenarios 
1.  Weak Reliance, Strong History 
Consider the following history of cases interpreting the Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”).53 The statute makes common 
carriers doing business in interstate commerce liable as a matter of 
federal law for the death or injury of their employees.54 The statute 
creates liability for 
injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence 
of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by 
reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its 
cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, 
boats, wharves, or other equipment.55  
Because the language merely says, “resulting in whole or in part from 
the [carrier’s negligence]” and “by reason of any defect or 
insufficiency, due to its negligence,” on several occasions courts have 
confronted the question of the statute’s standard of causation. 
The first such case to reach the Supreme Court was Rogers v. 
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.56 in 1957. Rogers, the plaintiff, had 
been working on the tracks, burning weeds, when a column of air 
created by a passing train fanned the flames. Rogers covered his face 
and stepped backward, suffering a fall that caused him serious 
 
 50. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 220 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 51. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 285–86 
(1985). For the argument that relaxation of statutory stare decisis should be further 
extended to allow common law development of statutory doctrine in certain 
circumstances, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 299–302 (2010). 
 52. ESKRIDGE, supra note 21, at 255–57. 
 53. 45 U.S.C. §	51 (2012). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. 352 U.S. 500 (1957). 
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injury.57 Some of the fault for the accident may have been Rogers’s 
own.58 For that reason, after a jury verdict for Rogers in a Missouri 
trial court, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed.59 The U.S. 
Supreme Court then reversed the Missouri appellate court in a 
unanimous decision, holding: 
Judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a jury 
question is presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry 
whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that 
negligence of the employer played any part at all in the injury 
or death.	.	.	.	The statute expressly imposes liability upon the 
employer to pay damages for injury or death due “in whole or 
in part” to its negligence.60  
In other words, contributory negligence is no bar to a case brought 
under FELA, and therefore proof of proximate cause is less 
demanding than under ordinary tort principles. 
The same result ensued six years later in Gallick v. Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad Co.61 A railroad employee, working on the railroad’s 
right of way near a fetid pool of standing water containing, among 
other things, dead rats, received an insect bite.62 The bite eventually 
led to an infection that coursed through his system and required the 
amputation of both legs. He, too, sued in state court and found the 
trial court’s judgment in his favor reversed for failure to establish 
proximate causation.63 Again, the Supreme Court reversed in a 
unanimous decision, holding that the only issue was whether the 
defendant’s negligence played any role in causing the plaintiff’s 
injuries.64 Congress did not require more exacting, common law proof 
of proximate causation, and state appellate courts, accustomed to 
reviewing jury instructions to determine their conformance with well-
settled common law principles, should understand that their role is 
more constrained when enforcing a federal statute.65 
It took more than half a century for the issue to arise again in the 
Supreme Court, this time in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride,66 
 
 57. Id. at 502. 
 58. Id. at 503–04. 
 59. Id. at 501. 
 60. Id. at 506–07 (citations omitted). 
 61. 372 U.S. 108 (1963). 
 62. Id. at 109. 
 63. Id. at 112–13. 
 64. Id. at 116, 120–22. 
 65. Id. at 113–16. 
 66. 131 S. Ct. 2630 (2011). 
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decided in 2011. The basic story is similar to that of the earlier cases67: 
McBride was a locomotive engineer for a freight train company. He 
was sent on a run between Indiana and Illinois, which required adding 
and removing railroad cars during a number of stops. An unusual 
configuration of the engines required that McBride use a hand brake 
to accomplish these tasks, which exposed him to additional risk of 
injury. Sure enough, his hand was severely injured by a handbrake 
that he had earlier complained was dangerous given the conditions of 
its use. 
McBride sued in federal district court and won. The jury was 
given the standard Seventh Circuit instruction that accorded with the 
decision in Rogers.68 In particular, there was no traditional common 
law instruction on proximate causation. Rather, the jury was 
instructed that the “Defendant ‘caused or contributed to’ Plaintiff’s 
injury if Defendant’s negligence played a part—no matter how 
small—in bringing about the injury.”69 CSX appealed to the Seventh 
Circuit, which affirmed.70 The Supreme Court affirmed again, this 
time in a five-to-four decision.71 Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority 
opinion, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.72 
Justice Thomas, the deciding vote, joined in most of the opinion and 
in the holding.73 Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices 
Scalia, Alito, and Kennedy.74 Thus, apart from Justice Thomas, the 
Justices voted predictably along ideological grounds, the liberals 
favoring broader avenues for employees to sue an employer and the 
conservatives wishing to constrain such actions more tightly. 
In justifying the tighter, FELA-specific standard of proximate 
cause, the majority opinion focused on the purpose and language of 
the statute and made strong use of the earlier decisions: “Countless 
judges have instructed countless juries in language drawn from 
Rogers. To discard or restrict the Rogers instruction now would ill 
serve the goals of ‘stability’ and ‘predictability’ that the doctrine of 
statutory stare decisis aims to ensure.”75 The dissent accused the 
majority of breaking new ground and noted that the Court had, in the 
past, read the requirement of proximate causation into a statutory 
 
 67. Id. at 2635–36. 
 68. Id. at 2636. 
 69. Id. at 2635. 
 70. Id. at 2635–36; McBride v. CSX Transp., Inc., 598 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 71. McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2644. 
 72. Id. at 2634. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 2644. 
 75. Id. at 2641. 
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scheme when the statute itself did not mention it.76 The dissent 
further engaged in a lengthy parsing of Rogers, arguing that it was 
never intended to be as broadly interpreted as the majority would 
have it, but rather was limited to the facts of that case, which more 
concerned contributory negligence than proximate causation.77 
None of the Justices actually eschewed the principle of statutory 
stare decisis. The dissent, however, would have interpreted Rogers so 
narrowly as to make it largely irrelevant. Such a narrow reading of 
precedent is prototypical common law reasoning. A statute is 
interpreted by distinguishing cases that would have it construed 
otherwise—all in the name of legislative primacy. 
2.  Weak History, Strong Reliance 
The overall story of CSX Transportation is very similar to that of 
Flood v. Kuhn,78 the poster child of strong stare decisis in statutory 
cases. Some fifty years before the 1972 Kuhn decision, the Supreme 
Court had decided, in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National 
League of Professional Baseball Clubs,79 that baseball was not subject 
to the antitrust laws since it was not interstate commerce.80 Thirty 
years later, in Toolson v. New York Yankees,81 the Court, in a per 
curiam decision, upheld Federal Baseball Club, not on the original 
ground, but because significant business reliance on the earlier 
decision had occurred in the interim and because only congressional 
action could make the antitrust laws apply to baseball.82 The Court 
further noted that in three decades Congress had never acted to 
override the earlier decision.83 
Thus, by the time Kurt Flood challenged his trade by the St. 
Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies after the 1969 season, 
baseball’s immunity from the antitrust laws had been entrenched for 
half a century and reaffirmed at approximately the half-way point. 
Flood challenged the so-called reserve clause, which would have 
given the Phillies (as designee of the Cardinals) the right to hold 
Flood to a one-year contract at eighty percent of his previous year’s 
salary if he did not agree to the trade. The Court upheld the provision 
 
 76. Id. at 2646 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 77. Id. at 2648–49. 
 78. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
 79. 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
 80. Id. at 200. 
 81. 346 U.S. 356 (1953). 
 82. Id. at 357. 
 83. Id. 
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because of the consequences that reversal of the earlier decision 
would have on the business of professional baseball.84 
As Professor Stephen Ross points out in his excellent essay on 
this case, the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of the baseball 
exemption was anything but a simple-minded application of stare 
decisis to a bad decision.85 For one thing, it was a five-to-three 
decision. Justice Marshall’s dissent succinctly describes the dividing 
issue: 
This is a difficult case because we are torn between the 
principle of stare decisis and the knowledge that the decisions in 
Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), 
and Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953), 
are totally at odds with more recent and better reasoned cases.86 
The majority decided that reliance on the earlier decision, 
combined with several failed congressional efforts to put baseball in 
the same position as other sports that lacked exemption from the 
antitrust laws, made stare decisis the better path, ultimately looking 
to Congress to change the law in the future if it so desired.87 
Acknowledging that baseball is indeed interstate commerce,88 the 
majority concluded:  
We continue to be loath, 50 years after Federal Baseball and 
almost two decades after Toolson, to overturn those cases 
judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed 
those decisions to stand for so long and, far beyond mere 
inference and implication, has clearly evinced a desire not to 
disapprove them legislatively.89 
Together, CSX Transportation and Kuhn tell a more subtle story 
of statutory stare decisis than does the standard account 
encompassing strong deference to judicial rulings in statutory cases. 
For one thing, both courts were divided. For another, the rationales 
were quite different. In CSX Transportation, most of the conservative 
judges wanted to overturn a precedent that they did not like, while 
the liberals wanted to preserve a precedent that they did like. The 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Stephen F. Ross, The Story of Flood v. Kuhn: Dynamic Interpretation, at the Time, 
in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 36 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey 
& Elizabeth Garrett eds., 2011). 
 86. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 290 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 87. Id. at 276 (majority opinion). 
 88. Id. at 282. 
 89. Id. at 283–84. 
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liberals won.90 In Kuhn, the dissenters were two liberal judges 
concerned chiefly about the inconsistency between the Court’s 
exemption of baseball and the inclusion of other sports under the 
antitrust laws.91 
Such battles are fought from time to time. The year after the 
Court decided CSX Transportation, it decided Kurns v. Railroad 
Friction Products Corp.92 The question there was whether the Federal 
Locomotive Inspection Act93 preempted state tort law.94 A decision 
from 1926, applying standards no longer in effect, gave the Federal 
Act broad preemptive priority over state law.95 When a railroad 
employee was diagnosed with mesothelioma, he sued the 
manufacturer of the locomotive on which he worked, claiming that it 
was defectively designed and that he was not given adequate warning 
about the dangers of the asbestos used in the brake linings.96 All nine 
Justices agreed that the Federal Act preempted the defective design 
claim brought under state law.97 The majority, however, construed the 
earlier decision broadly to preempt and preclude the failure-to-warn 
claim as well.98 Three dissenters would have construed the earlier 
decision more narrowly to allow this claim.99 Here, again, the issue 
was not the viability of the doctrine of statutory stare decisis but 
rather how broadly to construe the earlier precedent relied upon—as 
is so often the case in common law jurisprudence. 
In contrast to both Kurns and CSX Transportation, the debate in 
Kuhn was centered on the preservation of a decision that would 
surely have come out differently at the time of the later case and was 
probably a bad decision in the first place. The Court itself, however, 
had triggered such reliance in the business community that the 
majority believed it would be doing more harm than good to reverse 
itself at so late a juncture. 
 
 90. For an excellent study showing that the swing vote in many five-to-four decisions 
is made by a Justice who deviates from his or her ordinary political ideology because of 
special concerns in the particular case, see Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The 
Swing Justice, 75 J. POL. 1089, 1103 (2013). 
 91. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 291 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 92. 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012). 
 93. 49 U.S.C. §	20701 (1992). 
 94. Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1264. 
 95. Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926). 
 96. Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1264. The plaintiff died before the litigation was completed, 
and his estate replaced him as plaintiff. Id. at 1264–65. 
 97. Id. at 1270. 
 98. Id. at 1268. 
 99. Id. at 1271 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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An important qualifying note: there are very few Supreme Court 
cases in which statutory stare decisis is expressly at issue.100 This is not 
because the principle is irrelevant, but rather because the principle is 
sufficiently embedded in the jurisprudence of statutory interpretation 
that it is mostly beyond challenge.101 To illustrate, in 1993, the 
Supreme Court decided Smith v. United States,102 holding that trading 
a machine gun for illegal drugs constitutes “using a firearm” during 
and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.103 While subsequent 
litigants may wish to test the breadth of the statute, which establishes 
an enhanced sentence for those who use a firearm while buying or 
selling illegal drugs, once the Supreme Court held that trading a 
machine gun for drugs comes within the purview of the statute, that 
question effectively became off-limits.104 The Supreme Court has no 
reason to revisit the issue, and the lower courts are obliged to obey it. 
In short, statutory stare decisis is common law reasoning per se. 
II.  PRECEDENT AS METHOD IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Notwithstanding the focus on maintaining stability in statutory 
interpretation by adhering to prior decisions, very few statutory 
decisions turn on whether a court should abandon an old 
interpretation of a statutory provision in favor of a new 
interpretation. This Part first explores various ways in which a court 
may use precedent in statutory cases beyond merely applying it to 
similar facts to produce consistent outcomes. It then discusses three 
Supreme Court cases in detail. The cases reveal that the Justices at 
times agree on the relevant case law but not on its relative 
importance. More often, however, each side cites its own case law in 
the service of creating a coherent narrative in which that side’s 
position follows more directly from what has previously been decided. 
 
 100. The Supreme Court first used the term “statutory stare decisis” in 2007 in Rita v. 
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 368 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). Since then, it has used the term five more times (including in the cases 
discussed above). See Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135, S. Ct. 2401, 2409, 2413–14 
(2015); Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261, 1264 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 
2641 (2011); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 
U.S. 85, 89 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 101. See Schauer, supra note 37, at 127. 
 102. 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
 103. Id. at 237; 18 U.S.C. §	924(c)(1) (2012). 
 104. See, e.g., United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 678–79 (6th Cir. 2008). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1165 (2016) 
2016] STATUTES & PRECEDENT 1185 
A. Why Courts Rely on Precedent in Statutory Cases Even When the 
Precedent Does Not Address the Ultimate Issue 
Courts articulate four reasons for why they care about what 
earlier courts have said, even if what the earlier courts have said is not 
determinative of the case at hand or, in some instances, is not even 
determinative of the earlier case. 
First, resolving uncertainty in light of decisions in cases that 
construed a similar statute or resolved a similar interpretive problem 
in a dissimilar statute can add coherence to the corpus juris, to use 
Justice Scalia’s term.105 Just as a judge will take into account related 
doctrines in contract law to decide whether to apply a disputed 
contract law doctrine narrowly or expansively, that same judge will 
attempt to avoid making a muddle out of a statutory regime in which 
the statute at hand is situated. More generally but with less 
conviction, the judge will also attempt to avoid making a muddle out 
of the set of interpretive devices used to interpret statutes. 
All judges engage in this process, in line with Ronald Dworkin’s 
position that judges, whether in common law or statutory cases, are 
obliged to make the law as good as it can be.106 The appeal of such 
argumentation is increased by the fact that, as psychologists and 
philosophers have argued persuasively, people draw indirect 
inferences of intent from arguments about coherence.107 If d coheres 
with a, b, and c, and an issue arises as to whether d comes within a 
statute that includes the other three, we are likely to infer that the 
legislature intended it to come within the statute by virtue of its 
seeming like the other items, assuming that the language permits such 
an inference. It should not be surprising, then, that judges categorize 
a quest for coherence as a legislative value, making it easy to 
substitute intent for coherence in judicial reasoning. Thus, one judge 
may refer to cases in which courts have narrowly construed statutes 
with features similar to the statute in the case at hand to show 
coherence with the legal tradition, often attributing the quest for such 
coherence to the enacting legislature. Yet another judge may, in the 
same case, rely on legislative history showing that the legislature 
 
 105. W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1991). 
 106. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 411 (1986). 
 107. See GILBERT HARMAN & SANJEEV KULKARNI, RELIABLE REASONING: 
INDUCTION AND STATISTICAL LEARNING THEORY 10–11 (2007); Dan Simon, A Third 
View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
511, 537–41 (2004). For further discussion, see SOLAN, supra note 7, at 150. 
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intended the statute to have a broad meaning, each side thus creating 
its own coherent historical narrative.108 
A second reason for heavy reliance on case law in statutory 
interpretation is to demonstrate that an argument falls within the 
culture of legal reasoning and is thus entitled to some level of 
deference. Reliance on grammatical canons of construction, such as 
ejusdem generis109 and the rule of the last antecedent,110 fit into this 
category. It would be foolish, some sixty years after Professor Karl 
Llewellyn wrote his famous article on the malleability of the 
canons,111 for anyone to argue seriously that the canons are applied 
uniformly in all cases in which they are relevant. To the best of my 
knowledge, no one does. Yet, as we shall see, judges continue to cite 
these canons, not as the starting point for justifying their application 
in a particular case, but rather for the purpose of suggesting that they 
are sufficiently authoritative because they were used in earlier cases. 
The same holds true for instances in which a court construes a 
statutory word used in its ordinary sense because other courts have 
similarly construed that word. Although recent literature suggests 
that the legislature does not have such prior judicial interpretations in 
mind when it drafts new code provisions,112 earlier cases are 
frequently cited on the theory that the legislature does have these 
earlier constructions in mind.113 
Third, courts may actually develop principles that they wish to 
follow so that interpretation proceeds in a path-dependent manner.114 
 
 108. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), is such a case. This Article 
returns to coherence as a legal value in Part IV. 
 109. The Supreme Court has defined the canon as follows: “[I]t limits general terms 
which follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified; but it may not be used to 
defeat the obvious purpose of legislation.” Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 
(1936). It is still accepted by judges and scholars of various political stripes. See SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 5, at 200, 211. 
 110. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 37–38 (1993). The 
Supreme Court recently applied this principle in Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 
962–63 (2016). 
 111. Llewellyn, supra note 27, at 395. Perhaps the canons, when read fairly, are not as 
self-contradictory as Llewellyn argues; he makes his point by removing context from their 
application. See POSNER, supra note 27, at 281. Nonetheless, canons are certainly not 
reliable across-the-board principles of interpretation. 
 112. William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 171, 225 (2000); Gluck & Bressman, supra note 31, at 905. 
 113. See infra Part III. 
 114. For a discussion of path dependency in statutory interpretation, see Stephanie A. 
Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel Theory: Studying 
the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1166 (2005). Such interpretive principles 
need not be hard and fast rules, but may rather provide defaults, exceptions to which must 
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Such principles include substantive canons of construction, among 
them the rule of lenity,115 the rule of constitutional avoidance,116 and 
the rule that laws are to be construed as applying only within the 
territory.117 All of these canons are notoriously elastic and are applied 
so unevenly as to appear more as background values than as precise 
interpretive principles.118 Nonetheless, courts take them seriously, and 
they appear to influence the outcome of cases. 
Fourth, courts may rely upon principles that limit judges to a 
certain set of methods that must be used in a prescribed order. Recent 
scholarship, led by the work of Professor Abbe Gluck, has 
characterized such methods under the rubric of “methodological stare 
decisis.”119 Gluck’s review of the methods of statutory interpretation 
used in five different states revealed that many states appear to have 
adopted a type of modified textualism, in which extratextual material 
is permissible when used to resolve uncertainty, but should not be 
consulted when the language of the statute is dispositive. Among the 
types of extratextual evidence used by courts when the language of 
the statute is found to be indeterminate are legislative history, 
grammatical canons of construction, substantive tie-breaking 
principles, and additional contextual information. Using Wisconsin as 
an example, Gluck traces the history of the state supreme court’s 
 
be justified. See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET 
UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 9–14 (2009). 
 115. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 57, 86–102 (1998) (discussing unevenness in the application of the lenity principle). 
 116. “[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious 
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless 
such a construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Edward J. DeBartolo 
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). The 
scope of this canon’s interpretation has also been controversial. Compare SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 5, at 247–51 (“A statute should be interpreted in a way that avoids 
placing its constitutionality in doubt.”), with Bertrall L. Ross II, Against Constitutional 
Mainstreaming, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1253–61 (2011) (“[C]onstitutional mainstreaming 
is neither a necessary nor proper prophylactic tool for the protection of the constitutional 
core.”). 
 117. See discussion infra Section II.B.1. 
 118. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 590 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, and 
discussing the lack of precision in applying the canon of constitutional avoidance); Ross, 
supra note 116, at 1211. 
 119. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as 
“Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1918–20 (2011); Ethan J. Leib & 
Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
47, 47–49 (2010), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-costs-of-consensus-in-statutory-
construction [http://perma.cc/BKG7-T4NA]. 
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establishment of this hierarchy of considerations.120 Lower courts 
have adhered to this method, as have subsequent iterations of the 
supreme court itself—even the very justices who expressed 
disagreement with the method in the case in which it was 
established.121 Gluck further notes that, globally, the states vary to 
some extent with respect to the order in which these additional 
materials may be used. 
Although the use of a received body of methodological 
precedent occurs more often in state courts than in federal courts, 
constraints on the order in which interpretive principles are applied 
appear in both. For example, it is fairly well established that the rule 
of lenity is applied only after other interpretive methods fail to clarify 
the meaning of a criminal law.122 Otherwise, any indeterminacy in 
linguistic meaning would result in a defendant’s going free, no matter 
how remote such a result is from either a reasonable interpretation of 
the statute or the likely intent of the legislature (which are often the 
same).123 This is a form of methodological stare decisis. For that 
matter, so is the well-quoted statement of the Supreme Court: “The 
task	.	.	.	begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language 
of the statute itself.”124 
Yet the consensus among the Justices is narrow. Rampant 
disagreement remains as to what the correct set of ordering principles 
should be, even in the midst of calls for uniformity125 and even though 
consensus does exist on some points.126 In her empirical study of 
statutory decisions in the Roberts Court, Professor Anita 
Krishnakumar notes that the number of cases in which the Justices 
“duel” over particular canons is relatively low.127 She further observes 
that disagreement over both the basic tenets of textualism and the 
malleability of the canons even where judges agree on the order in 
 
 120. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty. (In re Criminal Complaint), 681 
N.W.2d 110, 122–27 (Wis. 2004); Gluck & Bressman, supra note 31, at 965. 
 121. Kalal, 681 N.W.2d at 127–28 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); Gluck & Bressman, 
supra note 31, at 965. 
 122. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990). 
 123. Thus, courts continue to refer to Justice Frankfurter’s approach to lenity, which is 
to apply it late in the analysis. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961). 
 124. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (emphasis added). 
 125. See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory 
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1880–81 (2008); Gluck, supra note 119, at 
1907–12. 
 126. See SOLAN, supra note 7, at 51–54, and Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of 
Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006), for discussion of the wide range of 
interpretive methods that appear to be well established. 
 127. Krishnakumar, supra note 27, at 934. 
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which to apply them are grounds for pessimism with respect to the 
establishment of uniform methodology in the federal courts.128 
B. Three Examples of the Diffuse Reliance on Precedent 
Let us look more closely at just what the Supreme Court does 
when it references earlier decisions in deciding current cases. I have 
selected three close decisions in which the statutory issue presents 
reasonable opportunities for both sides to make persuasive 
arguments. In all three cases it is possible not only to analogize the 
issue to others the Court has decided but also to distinguish the case 
at hand from earlier cases. In the end, the Justices’ varied reasoning 
all sounds very much like that of common law judges. 
The first case, Small v. United States,129 concerns whether a law 
prohibiting those convicted of a serious crime from owning a gun 
should be applied when the predicate crime occurred outside the 
United States. The second, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co.,130 concerns the interpretation of a civil rights law outlawing 
employment discrimination. The law includes a 180-day limitation 
period. The question presented was whether the limitation period 
expires 180 days after the initial decision to discriminate in salary has 
been made or whether, instead, each periodic payment constitutes a 
new act of discrimination, effectively resetting the limitation period. 
The third case, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,131 involved the 
scope of an exemption to the Federal Arbitration Act (”FAA”) for 
contracts of employment with employees “engaged in” interstate 
commerce. The case considered whether the exemption should be 
limited to transportation workers, who are expressly mentioned in the 
statute, or should be more broadly construed to extend the exemption 
to the furthest limits of the Commerce Clause. 
1.  Small v. United States 
In Small, the question turned on the meaning of “any.” Gary 
Small had been convicted and sentenced to five years in prison in 
Japan for violating Japanese gun laws. He had smuggled firearms into 
Japan by placing them in water heaters that he claimed to be 
importing into the country as gifts.132 When Small returned to the 
United States, he quickly bought a gun and was then prosecuted for 
 
 128. See id. at 981–89. 
 129. 544 U.S. 385 (2005). 
 130. 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
 131. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 132. Small, 544 U.S. at 395 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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violating a statute that makes it unlawful “for any person—who has 
been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year	.	.	.	to	.	.	.	possess	.	.	.	any firearm.”133 
The trial court rejected Small’s argument that the term “any court” 
should be construed to refer only to domestic courts.134 He was 
convicted, and the court of appeals affirmed.135 The Supreme Court 
reversed in a five-to-three decision, with the majority opinion written 
by Justice Breyer.136 
How does one decide whether “any court” should be construed 
as applying only within the United States or as applying worldwide? 
The majority (correctly) held that the language alone cannot answer 
the question because it is perfectly reasonable, if applying the statute 
in isolation, to construe the language either way.137 When a 
presidential candidate says he does not want to miss “any state” in his 
campaign tour, he means all fifty. But when, as the majority notes, 
after discussing films playing in local theaters, one friend says to the 
other, “I’ll see any film,” the friend is most likely referring to those 
films within the universe of films under discussion.138 It would be 
strange to take someone up on that statement by insisting on seeing a 
film that hadn’t been discussed.  
Thus, one might look to the purpose of the statute, any extrinsic 
evidence of intent, and existing custom with respect to interpreting 
statutes extraterritorially. The last of these may also be seen as a 
proxy for legislative intent or as an independently motivated principle 
of statutory interpretation, viz. a substantive canon of construction. In 
either case, some reference to the case law would be required to 
determine the custom or verify the rule. 
What tipped the case in favor of a territorial interpretation of 
“any court” was the observation that conduct punishable in various 
countries may not be criminal at all in the United States; thus the 
majority defaulted to the presumption that laws are assumed to 
govern conduct within the territory, absent evidence to the 
contrary.139 There is a canon of construction to this effect, but, as the 
 
 133. 18 U.S.C. §	922(g)(1) (2012). 
 134. See United States v. Small, 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 770 (W.D. Pa. 2002), aff’d, 333 
F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 385 (2005). 
 135. Small v. United States, 333 F.3d 425, 425 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 136. Small, 544 U.S. at 386–87. 
 137. Id. at 388. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 389–91. In this regard, the Court noted the absence of legislative history one 
way or the other that might have indicated whether Congress intended the law to include 
crimes committed outside the United States. Id. at 393. 
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majority concedes and the dissent exploits, Small was not convicted of 
committing a crime abroad.140 Rather, he was convicted of committing 
a crime in the United States, an element of which occurred abroad.141 
Other arguments raised by the majority were grounded in the 
structure of the statute taken as a whole, although the Court could 
instead have resorted to case law. There is indeed a canon of 
construction that tells courts that they should construe a statute so 
that it makes sense as a whole.142 But the Court did not bother 
referring to it. Instead, it noted: 
For example, the statute specifies that predicate crimes include 
“a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” Again, the 
language specifies that these predicate crimes include only 
crimes that are “misdemeanor[s] under Federal or State law.” If 
“convicted in any court” refers only to domestic convictions, 
this language creates no problem. If the phrase also refers to 
foreign convictions, the language creates an apparently 
senseless distinction between (covered) domestic relations 
misdemeanors committed within the United States and 
(uncovered) domestic relations misdemeanors committed 
abroad.143 
The majority made additional arguments based on the statute’s 
references to domestic law in defining various enhancements and 
exceptions to the statute’s general scheme. The opinion 
acknowledged that the purpose of the statute (keeping guns out of the 
hands of firearm law offenders) would be better served by construing 
the law extraterritorially but took comfort in the fact that there have 
been very few cases over the years in which the statute could have 
been applied to an overseas offender.144 
The dissent, written by Justice Thomas, relied both on cases that 
broadly construe “any” in other contexts145 and on the statute’s 
purpose of keeping guns out of the hands of those convicted of 
 
 140. Id. at 389 (“And, although the presumption against extraterritorial application 
does not apply directly to this case, we believe a similar assumption is appropriate when 
we consider the scope of the phrase ‘convicted in any court’ here.”); id. at 399 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“In prosecuting Small, the Government is enforcing a domestic criminal 
statute to punish domestic criminal conduct.”).  
 141. See id. at 387 (majority opinion). 
 142. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) (arguing that the Court should 
consider statutory language in light of the entire act). 
 143. Small, 544 U.S. at 391–92 (citations omitted). 
 144. See id. at 394. 
 145. See id. at 396 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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serious crimes.146 But Justice Thomas relied most heavily on the 
argument that the majority misapplied the canon disfavoring 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Rather than applying the 
canon correctly, he argued, the majority created a new “clear 
statement rule” that requires the legislature to indicate clearly its 
intent that a law contains elements that include conduct abroad, 
whatever may be the most reasonable interpretation and regardless of 
legislative intent.147 Justice Breyer denied creating any such new 
rule,148 and Justice Thomas rejected the denial.149 
In making these arguments, each side cited case after case. 
Sometimes, the citations were germane to the points being made. At 
other times, however, the citations appear to justify arguments having 
little to do with the usual uses of precedent—except to create the 
impression that if another judge has said it before, such use makes it 
more legitimate to act similarly now. 
In all, the majority made seventeen citations to judicial decisions, 
and the dissent made twenty-four.150 The table below shows how each 
side supported its arguments with case law.151 
 
 146. See id. at 397. 
 147. Id. at 398–99. 
 148. Id. at 390 (majority opinion). 
 149. Id. at 398–99 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 150. In a footnote, the dissent also attempted to distinguish three of the cases used by 
the majority, illustrating a narrow, contextualized understanding of “any.” See id. at 398 
n.4 (first citing Nixon v Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004); then citing Raygor v. 
Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 540–41 (2002); and then citing Atascadero State 
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 245–46 (1985)). 
 151. The tables tally both sides’ citations to earlier case law in support of particular 
arguments. In each of the three tables, the Court at times cites to the same case multiple 
times for the same proposition. This Article is more concerned with the number of times 
that the Court relies on precedent than with the number of cases cited. Thus, each citation 
is reflected in the numbers in the table. 
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Table 1—The Use of Precedent by the Majority and Dissenting 
Opinions in Small v. United States 
 
Argument Majority Dissent 
1. “Convicted in any court” 
may include foreign convictions; 
“any” is construed broadly in 
some instances. 
2152 4153 
2. “Convicted in any court” 
may not include foreign 
convictions. 
2154 0 
3. “Any” (and other general 
words) should be understood in 
context. 
6155 1156 
4. Congress legislates with 
domestic concerns in mind. 
4157 10158 
 
 
 152. Small, 544 U.S. at 387 (first citing United States v. Atkins, 872 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 
1989); and then citing United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754, 757–59 (6th Cir. 1986)). 
 153. Id. at 396 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (first citing United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 
1, 5 (1997); then citing Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130–31 
(2002); then citing Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 400–01 (1998); and then citing 
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 356, 358 (1994)). 
 154. Id. at 387 (majority opinion) (first citing United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 95 
(2d Cir. 2003); and then citing United States v. Concha, 233 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 
2000)). 
 155. Id. at 388 (first citing United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818); 
then citing Nixon, 541 U.S. at 132; then citing Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. at 357; then citing 
Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1981); 
then citing Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 149 (1960); and then citing Gonzales, 520 
U.S. at 5). 
 156. Id. at 397 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 
(1993)). 
 157. Id. at 388 (majority opinion) (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993)); 
id. at 389 (first citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); then citing 
Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 631; and then citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 
244, 249–51 (1991)). 
 158. Id. at 399–401 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (first citing Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 
at 248; then citing Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371–72 (2005); then citing 
Smith, 507 U.S. at 203–04; then citing Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 249–51; then citing 
Foley Bros., Inc., 336 U.S. at 285–86; then citing Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 630–34; 
then citing Smith, 507 U.S. at 204 n.5 (1993); then citing Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 
248; then citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993); and then citing 
Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 630–34). 
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Argument Majority Dissent 
5. There is justification from 
the purpose of the statute for 
thinking Congress intended 
extraterritorial application. 
3159 0 
6. Statute referring to 
“convictions” has no modifier 
and sets no limits. 
0 2160 
7. Statutes must be construed 
to avoid absurd results. 
0 3161 
8. Court should adhere to 
unambiguous meaning instead 
of guessing intent. 
0 2162 
9. Divining legislative intent 
should not be a court’s goal. 0 2
163 
 
The citations reveal some interesting patterns. Rows 1 and 2 
show the majority’s references to lower court cases splitting over the 
interpretation of a single statute as the basis for the Small Court’s 
granting certiorari.164 The majority also cited cases quoting the 
Supreme Court to the effect that “any” should be construed in 
context.165 The dissent acknowledged this but also added to the list of 
cases in which the Supreme Court has construed “any” broadly in 
interpreting other statutes. One of these cases, relying on a dictionary 
 
 159. Id. at 393–94 (first citing Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 112 
(1983); then citing Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60–62, 66 (1980); and then citing 
Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974)). 
 160. Id. at 396 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (first citing Lewis, 445 U.S. at 60; and then 
citing Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 5). 
 161. Id. at 404 (first citing Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470–71 (1989); 
then citing Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 141 (2004); and then citing Sturges v. 
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 203 (1819)). 
 162. Id. at 405–06 (first citing Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 368 (1994); and 
then citing Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 262 (1994)). 
 163. See id. at 406 (first citing Beecham, 511 U.S. at 374; and then citing Koons Buick 
Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 73 (2004)). 
 164. One basis for the Supreme Court accepting a case for review is a conflict among 
the courts of appeals. Id. at 387 (majority opinion) (“Because the Circuits disagree about 
the matter, we granted certiorari.”). 
 165. See cases cited supra note 155.  
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to define “any,”166 was quoted verbatim to suggest that the dictionary 
definition should have even more authority because the Court had 
previously used it.167 
Both sides cite many cases for the proposition that statutes 
should generally be construed to apply within the territory, albeit for 
opposing purposes. Breyer uses these cases to justify not giving an 
extraterritorial interpretation to the statute at hand.168 Thomas uses 
similar cases to argue that Breyer abuses the principle.169 The dissent 
further uses case law to criticize the majority for caring about 
legislative intent at all in the teeth of a statute whose language, as 
demonstrated both by earlier case law and dictionary definitions, is 
unambiguous on its face. 
Small is a single case. Thus, no inferences about the general 
practices of these individual Justices should be drawn. Nonetheless, 
by examining a case that appears simple enough on its face, it quickly 
becomes clear that the Justices believe that reference to an earlier 
case in which a particular kind of argument was made lends credence 
to the use of that argument in the case before the Court. It is also 
important to note that there are a number of arguments on which 
both sides weigh in, while only Justice Breyer writes specifically about 
purpose (although Justice Thomas alludes to it), and only Justice 
Thomas makes various textualist arguments and refers to the absurd 
result rule.170 Krishnakumar’s empirical study shows that the Justices 
duel far more often over Supreme Court precedent (sixty-three 
percent of contested cases)171 than they duel over substantive canons 
of construction (six percent of contested cases).172 Small contains 
disputes over both case law and canons. 
There are several core issues in this case: Is the language of the 
statute susceptible to being understood and applied in more than one 
way? If so, should the statute be construed extraterritorially to 
include crimes committed abroad or confined to instances in which all 
 
 166. Small, 544 U.S. at 396 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 
520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 97 
(1976))). 
 167. Scholars have engaged in a great deal of analysis of the Supreme Court’s use of 
dictionaries, especially since the appointment of Justice Scalia to the Court in 1986. For an 
insightful recent work with reference to the literature on this issue, see generally James J. 
Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries 
in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483 (2013). 
 168. Small, 544 U.S. at 387–94. 
 169. Id. at 399–406 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 170. Compare supra Table 1, Rows 2 & 5, with supra Table 1, Rows 6–9. 
 171. Krishnakumar, supra note 27, at 929 tbl.1. 
 172. Id. 
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of the statute’s elements occur domestically? This question raises 
additional ones: Did the legislature intend extraterritorial 
application? Even if the legislature did not have any intent with 
respect to this narrow issue, would limiting the statute’s domain 
undermine the legislature’s purpose in enacting it? Should it matter 
whether the crime in the foreign country is also a crime in the United 
States? If so, how should the analysis of that issue occur? Will 
criminal conduct go undeterred if the law is construed narrowly? Will 
the Court create an incoherent jurisprudence if it decides the case one 
way or the other? Some of these questions are best answered by 
looking at earlier cases, but some are not. It should not matter that 
judges have construed “any” broadly in some cases and narrowly in 
others (although if courts construed the word uniformly in one 
direction or the other as a matter of legal policy, that would be 
relevant).173 
In fact, the only facts that should be relevant to the 
determination of this case are: 
1. Lower courts disagreed about the interpretation of the 
statute in question, which is the basis for the Supreme Court’s 
grant of certiorari; and 
2. Courts prefer territorial interpretation of statutes. 
Irrelevant to the resolution of the dispute are: 
1. The use of the dictionary by courts in the past to define 
“any”; and 
2. The absurd result rule, because neither side has taken a 
position that is absurd.174 
Yet there is legitimate room for debate about whether the statute 
should be applied to include conduct outside the United States. 
Justice Thomas is right: usually, that rule applies to situations in 
which the illegal conduct occurred abroad.175 But the statute in 
 
 173. Not much has changed since the Court decided Small. In Ali v. Federal Bureau of 
Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008), the Court revisited the meaning of “any” in the context of the 
Federal Torts Claims Act. This time, Justice Thomas wrote for the majority, again citing 
cases in which “any” was construed broadly to support the majority’s position that it 
should be construed broadly in the context of that case as well. Id. at 218–20. Justice 
Breyer remarked in dissent that when he asks his wife if there is any butter, he asks not of 
the whole town, but merely of their refrigerator. Id. at 243–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 174. See Small, 544 U.S. at 404 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the absurd result 
doctrine does not apply to the dissent’s interpretation). 
 175. Id. at 400 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). 
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question is different, and the majority’s interpretation of the canon on 
territoriality does not fly in the face of prior decisions. The argument 
thus structured is about the interpretation of a canon whose 
application is subject to reasonable disagreement. In such a 
circumstance, courts should concern themselves with furthering the 
purposes of the statute and producing felicitous consequences rather 
than focusing on the use of precedent. In this regard, it is noteworthy 
that the Justices engaged in very little analogical reasoning.176 The 
opinion contains little discussion of how particular precedents, while 
not dispositive, were well reasoned and on point with respect to the 
puzzle presented in this case. 
What further makes Small interesting is that two legal values 
conflict openly. The most efficient application of the law to the facts is 
the majority’s: it keeps a simple presumption that laws apply within 
the territory and avoids having to address the difficult question about 
which foreign laws to credit.177 This result will likely cause fewer 
problems for law enforcement, since very few prosecutions have been 
brought where the predicate crime occurred in a foreign country.178 
On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the purpose 
underlying the legislation would be better served by adopting the 
dissenting opinion. When a person is imprisoned for smuggling 
firearms into a foreign country and immediately buys more weaponry 
upon his return, it is hard to imagine a more appropriate case for 
prosecution based on a law intended to keep firearms out of the 
hands of felons. Casting the issues in this light, much of the discussion 
about precedent appears to be a smokescreen designed to cloak 
policy disagreement in the garb of the judicially legitimate practice of 
following precedent. Under the guise of deference to the legislature, 
judges privilege their own preferences in interpreting statutes. 
2.  Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
Lilly Ledbetter worked for Goodyear, mostly as a supervisor, 
from 1979 until her retirement in 1998.179 Shortly before her 
retirement, she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment 
 
 176. For a discussion of differences between analogical reasoning and adherence to 
precedent, see Schauer, supra note 37, at 123–34. Only in the former are the substantive 
merits of the argument relevant. 
 177. Small, 544 U.S. at 385. 
 178. See id. at 394 (“[A]ccording to the Government, since 1968, there have probably 
been no more than ‘10 to a dozen’ instances in which such a foreign conviction has served 
as a predicate for a felon-in-possession prosecution.”). 
 179. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007); id. at 643 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), a prerequisite for filing a 
lawsuit under the Civil Rights Act. She claimed that her salary had 
dipped significantly below those of men in the same position via a 
history of smaller-than-average raises based upon bogus performance 
reports.180 The relevant statute, part of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to [her] compensation	.	.	.	because 
of such individual’s	.	.	.	sex.”181 She eventually filed suit in federal 
district court, and the case was tried before a jury.182 Ledbetter won, 
but the court of appeals reversed the judgment,183 concluding that 
Ledbetter’s case had not been filed “within one hundred and eighty 
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,” as the 
statute requires.184 The court of appeals held that the term 
“discriminate” in the statute refers to the initial willful act of deciding 
to pay an employee less because of sex (or race, ethnicity, or another 
protected category) and that the 180 days begins to run once that act 
of discrimination has occurred.185 The court rejected Ledbetter’s 
argument that each paycheck that paid her less because of her sex 
constituted a separate act of discrimination.186 
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. Writing 
the majority opinion, Justice Alito devoted much of the opinion to 
arguing that the weight of prior Supreme Court decisions construing 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in other contexts supported 
Goodyear’s position. Goodyear had argued that the initial 
discriminatory decision defined the time from which the statute 
begins to run—rather than some later time when the plaintiff suffered 
harm as a result of the earlier decision.187 The cases supporting 
Goodyear’s position included a decision not to restore seniority to an 
individual who claimed to have been wrongfully dismissed several 
 
 180. Id. at 621–22 (majority opinion); id. at 643–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 181. 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 182. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 622 (majority opinion); id. at 644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 183. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1172 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 184. 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-5(e)(1). 
 185. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1182–83. 
 186. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628–29. In “disparate treatment” cases of the kind that 
Ledbetter brought, intent is an element of the statute. 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-2(k)(3) (“[A] rule 
barring the employment of an individual who currently and knowingly uses or possesses a 
controlled substance [without authorization]	.	.	.	shall be considered an unlawful 
employment practice under this subchapter only if such rule is adopted or applied with an 
intent to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”); Chardon v. 
Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (per curiam); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 301 U.S. 424, 432 
(1971). 
 187. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 622. 
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years earlier;188 a case involving a professor who was denied tenure 
but waited to file suit until his actual termination one year after the 
tenure decision;189 and a case involving workers who were ultimately 
dismissed because of a seniority plan that they claimed had been 
adopted years earlier with discriminatory intent.190 However, the 
Court ruled in another case that a series of acts creating a hostile 
work environment may all be included within the period of the statute 
of limitations, provided that the most recent act occurred within the 
180-day statutory period.191 The majority distinguished that case from 
Ledbetter’s situation, which did not include a claim of a hostile work 
environment.192 
Troublesome for the majority (and ipso facto helpful to the 
dissent) was the case of Bazemore v. Friday.193 In Bazemore a 
company abandoned an earlier, discriminatory seniority scheme in 
favor of a nondiscriminatory one after the enactment of the civil 
rights laws.194 Employees whose salaries remained depressed because 
they had not received raises under the old system sued. The employer 
argued that the statute of limitations had run, but the Supreme Court, 
consistent with Ms. Ledbetter’s later position, held that each 
paycheck constituted a new act of discrimination.195 In her dissent in 
Ledbetter, Justice Ginsburg relied heavily on this decision,196 
distinguishing the cases that the majority relied upon as involving 
discreet, identifiable acts of discrimination. Discrimination in salary, 
in contrast, may occur over a long period of time and may be very 
difficult to discover because employees do not always share with one 
another information about their earnings.197 Justice Alito, in turn, 
responded to the dissent’s argument by distinguishing Bazemore, 
because there, the earlier compensation scheme was intentionally 
discriminatory: “Because Ledbetter has not adduced evidence that 
Goodyear initially adopted its performance-based pay system in order 
to discriminate on the basis of sex or that it later applied this system 
 
 188. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977). 
 189. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980). 
 190. Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Ledbetter, 550 
U.S. 618. 
 191. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117–18 (2002). 
 192. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 638–40. 
 193. 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam). 
 194. Id. at 390–91 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 407 (White, J., concurring). 
 195. Id. at 395–96 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 196. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 197. Id. 
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to her within the charging period with any discriminatory animus, 
Bazemore is of no help to her.”198 
Below is a table describing the use of precedent by the two sides. 
In total, there are ninety-nine citations to judicial decisions: forty-one 
by the majority and fifty-eight by the dissent. Many of the cases cited 
appear multiple times. 
 
Table 2—The Use of Precedent by Majority and Dissenting 
Opinions in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
 
Argument Majority Dissent 
1. Filing period starts when a 
discreet discriminatory act occurs. 
16199 0 
2. Demonstrating split among 
circuit courts. 
2200 0 
3. The central element in a 
disparate treatment claim is 
intent. 
3201 0 
4. Congress adopted a multistep 
enforcement procedure for civil 
rights cases, and courts should 
apply the Act as written. 
2202 0 
 
 
 
 198. Id. at 637 (majority opinion). 
 199. Id. at 621 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002)); 
id. at 625–28 (first citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977); then 
citing Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257–58 (1980); then citing Lorance v. AT&T 
Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 907–08, 911 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618; and 
then citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113); id. at 636 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113); id. at 639 
(citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113); id. at 641–42 (citing Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. NLRB, 
362 U.S. 411, 416–17 (1960)). 
 200. Id. at 623 (first citing Forsyth v. Fed’n Emp’t & Guidance Serv., 409 F.3d 565 (2d 
Cir. 2005); and then citing Shea v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 
 201. Id. at 624 (first citing Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (per curiam); 
then citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); and 
then citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 1002 (1988) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring)). There is considerable overlap between Rows 1 and 3, with some cases being 
used to make both points. 
 202. Id. at 629 (citing Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359 
(1977)); id. at 630 (citing Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 819 (1980)). 
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Argument Majority Dissent 
5. The courts should not 
truncate Congress’s deadlines. 
5203 0 
6. Statutes of limitation serve 
the function of establishing 
repose for employers. 
5204 0 
7. Agency has no special claim 
to deference in this context. 
4205 0 
8. Reference to other acts. 3206 0 
9. Paychecks perpetuating past 
discrimination are actionable. 
0 15207 
10. Questions what constitutes 
an unlawful employment practice 
and when one has occurred. 
0 1208 
 
 
 203. Id. at 630 (first citing Int’l Bhd. Of Elec. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 
U.S. 229, 236–40 (1976); and then citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 
47–49 (1974)); id. at 632 (first citing Mohasco Corp., 447 U.S. at 826; then citing Morgan, 
536 U.S. at 109; and then citing Elec. Workers, 429 U.S. at 236). 
 204. Id. at 630 (first citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554–55 
(1974); then citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (quoting Order of 
R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)); then citing 
Ricks, 449 U.S. at 256–57; and then citing Mohasco Corp., 447 U.S. at 825); id. at 642 
(citing Mohasco Corp., 447 U.S. at 825). 
 205. Id. at 642 n.11 (first citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 111 n.6; and then citing Reno v. 
Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 n.5 (2000)). 
 206. Id. at 641–42 (first citing Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 909 (1989)), 
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as 
recognized in Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618; then citing Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 
226 n.8 (1982); and then citing Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 416–17 
(1960)). 
 207. Id. at 646–48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (first citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 
385, 395 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring); and then citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 111–12); id. 
at 648 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115); id. at 649 (first citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117; then 
citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395–96; and then citing Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe 
Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 502 n.15 (1968)); id. at 654–55 (first citing Forsyth v. Fed’n 
Emp’t & Guidance Serv., 409 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2005); then citing Shea v. Rice, 409 
F.3d 448, 452–53 (D.C. Cir. 2005); then citing Goodwin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 
1005, 1009–10 (10th Cir. 2002); then citing Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 335 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999); then citing Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1025–29 (7th 
Cir. 2003); then citing Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 2001); then citing 
Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 167–68 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc); 
then citing Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 347–49 (4th Cir. 1994); and 
then citing Gibbs v. Pierce Cty. Law Enf’t Support Agency, 785 F.2d 1396, 1399–1400 (9th 
Cir. 1986)). 
 208. Id. at 645 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110). 
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Argument Majority Dissent 
11. Cases distinguish between 
practices that are easy to detect 
and those which are cumulative. 
0 5209 
12. When a practice is 
cumulatively discriminatory, it 
doesn’t matter that some of the 
events occurred before the 
statutory period. 
1210 5211 
13. Employee salary information 
is usually not published. 
0 2212 
14. The statute begins to run 
when a discreet act occurs. 
0 5213 
15. Cutting off right to sue for 
salary discrimination is 
inconsistent with purpose of 
statute. 
0 3214 
 
 
 
 
 
 209. Id. at 645 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114); id. at 647–48 (quoting Morgan, 536 
U.S. at 110–15); id. at 651–52 (first citing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 902, 905; then citing Ricks, 
449 U.S. at 253–54, 257–58; and then citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 
554–57 (1977)). 
 210. Id. at 638 n.7 (majority opinion) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117). 
 211. Id. at 648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117); id. at 649 
n.2 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117); id. at 649 (first citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117; then 
citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395–96; and then citing Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 502 n.15). 
 212. Id. at 649–50 (first citing Goodwin, 275 F.3d at 1008; and then citing McMillan v. 
Mass. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 296 (1st Cir. 1998)). 
 213. Id. at 647 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110, 113); id. at 651 (first citing Ricks, 449 
U.S. at 253–54, 257–58; and then citing Evans, 431 U.S. at 554–57); id. at 652 n.4 (citing 
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 412, 414 (1960); id. at 652 (citing Lorance, 
490 U.S. at 902, 905). 
 214. Id. at 654 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 119); id. at 660–61 (first citing Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1977); and then citing Albemarle Paper Co. 
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)). 
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Argument Majority Dissent 
16. Courts of appeals have 
routinely supported employees’ 
positions in these cases. 
0 9215 
18. EEOC is due deference. 0 2216 
19. Employers are adequately 
protected from unfair suits. 
0 7217 
20. Other statutes are not given 
such hurdles. 0 1
218 
 
The distribution of arguments in Ledbetter is quite different from 
that in Small. In Small, the Justices generally agreed on the issues 
presented and the import of the relevant cases. The Justices disagreed 
only about how to weigh facts and values. Thomas relied heavily on 
the legitimacy of established canons, which, in his view, would be 
applied more or less mechanically as though they were themselves 
statutes.219 Breyer, in contrast, concerned himself more with the 
consequences of the decision and was more willing to look at the 
canon as a rule of thumb whose application could be modified 
according to the circumstances of the case.220 Neither side had a 
strong argument on the plain language of the statute, although 
Thomas relied heavily on a dictionary definition (and on an earlier 
case citing that same definition with respect to another statute) in 
 
 215. Id. at 654–55 (first citing Forsyth v. Fed’n Emp’t & Guidance Serv., 409 F.3d 565, 
573 (2d Cir. 2005); then citing Shea v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448, 452–53 (D.C. Cir. 2005); then 
citing Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1025–29 (7th Cir. 2003); then 
citing Goodwin, 275 F.3d at 1009–10; then citing Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 257 (3d 
Cir. 2001); then citing Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1999); then citing 
Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 167–68 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc); 
then citing Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 347–49 (4th Cir. 1994); and 
then citing Gibbs v. Pierce Cty. Law Enf’t Support Agency, 785 F.2d 1396, 1399–1400 (9th 
Cir. 1986)). 
 216. Id. at 656 n.6 (first citing Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002); 
and then citing Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 518 (1986)). 
 217. Id. at 657–58 (first citing Ricks, 449 U.S. at 256–57; then citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 
121–22; and then citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982)). 
 218. Id. at 658 (citing Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208–10 (1974)). 
 219. See Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 396–97, 399–400 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 220. Id. at 388–90 (majority opinion). For a discussion of this “pragmatic” approach to 
judging, see RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 230–56 (2008). 
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concluding that the meaning of the statute was less subject to multiple 
interpretations than Breyer’s opinion would suggest. 
In Ledbetter, on the other hand, the opposing Justices—Alito 
and Ginsburg—operated from fundamentally different perspectives. 
Alito paid lip service to the language of the statute being more 
amenable to the majority’s interpretation than to the dissent’s, but 
most of his opinion was devoted to common law reasoning. The 
Court’s opinions, he argued, were more aligned with Goodyear’s 
position than with Ledbetter’s.221 Ginsburg, in response, fought tit-
for-tat on the case law analysis, but added powerful argumentation 
about the statute’s purpose.222 Note the number of rows in Table 2 in 
which only one of the two opinions has any entry at all. This reflects 
the importance that each side put on demonstrating that its position 
fit coherently with the past. They disagreed only over how to 
characterize the relevant past. 
It should be noted that while Goodyear won the battle, 
employers lost the war. The case became a campaign issue in the 2008 
race between Senators Barack Obama and John McCain.223 Within 
weeks of Obama’s inauguration, Congress passed and the president 
signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,224 reversing the 
results of the case. However, as Deborah Widiss points out, lower 
courts continued for some time to refer to Ledbetter as precedent, 
arguing that Congress did not fully override the decision, leaving the 
precedent as authority on which courts may rely.225 
In essence, both of these cases suggest that courts are more 
aggressive in creating “common law statutes”226 than standard 
 
 221. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628–29 (majority opinion). 
 222. Id. at 651–54 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 223. Obama Highlights Support for Veterans, Working Women, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 19, 
2008, at A5; David G. Savage, Two Visions of the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 
2008, at A8; Bob Egelko, Next President Will Shape Supreme Court, S.F. GATE (Oct. 20, 
2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Next-president-will-shape-Supreme-
Court-3264700.php [http://perma.cc/6Y68-P3PG]. 
 224. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-5 
(2012)).   
 225. See Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra 
Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 923 n.371 (2012). See 
Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 25, at 1442–45, for a discussion of how courts 
routinely interpret statutory language to preserve previous decisions. 
 226. For early discussion of the concept of “common law statutes,” including legislation 
such as the antitrust laws, see POSNER, supra note 51, at 285–88. For an argument that 
criminal statutes, in particular those defining various species of fraud, should be 
considered common law statutes, see Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law 
Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 373–78. We return to the creation of common law statutes 
infra Part III. 
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accounts of statutory interpretation that focus on the primacy of the 
legislature would indicate—and they are certainly more aggressive 
than their own rhetoric of deference to the legislature would suggest. 
Judges focused on close questions, even with respect to narrow laws, 
pay a great deal of attention to prior judicial interpretation, while 
they often eschew legislative history as selective, irrelevant, or both. 
3.  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams 
Sinclair Adams, an employee of Circuit City, sued his employer 
in a California state court under that state’s antidiscrimination laws.227 
However, upon joining the company, he had signed an agreement 
providing that disputes between him and Circuit City would be 
resolved through arbitration. Accordingly, the company filed suit in 
federal court under the Federal Arbitration Act, requesting that 
Adams’ lawsuit be enjoined and that the matter be sent to arbitration 
for resolution.228 Circuit City won in the district court.229 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,230 and the Supreme 
Court reversed again in a five-to-four decision, reinstating the trial 
court’s order that the case be arbitrated.231 Justice Kennedy wrote the 
majority opinion; Justices Stevens and Souter wrote dissenting 
opinions. 
At issue was the scope of an exemption under the Federal 
Arbitration Act for employment contracts in section 1 of that Act, 
and its relationship with the Act’s principle provision in section 2, 
which requires that courts generally honor arbitration agreements.232 
Section 2 provides that 
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract 
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part 
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an 
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, 
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
 
 227. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109–10 (2001).   
 228. Id. at 110. 
 229. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, No. C98-0365 CAL, 1998 WL 1797183, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. May 4, 1998). 
 230. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 231. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 124. 
 232. Id. at 109. 
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upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.233 
The employment exception in section 1 states that the Act shall not 
apply “to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or 
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce.”234 
At the time the Federal Arbitration Act was enacted, it was 
generally understood that the Commerce Clause would apply only to 
those workers who were actually working in the movement of goods 
from state to state.235 Thus, it is possible that section 1 was intended to 
apply only to transportation workers (as the majority held), 
construing the words “or any other class of workers engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce” to mean other transportation 
workers by virtue of the canon ejusdem generis.236 
But there is another possible reading of section 1. Congress may 
have intended the exception to extend to all workers over whom the 
Commerce Clause permitted federal legislation at the time that a 
lawsuit was brought. The workers mentioned specifically in the 
statute would then be classes of workers so identified. The ambiguity 
thus resembles that of class bequests in the law of wills. For example, 
if a testator says: “I leave $100,000 to my grandchildren, to be shared 
equally among them,” the bequest can reasonably be thought to 
evince the intent either for the money to be shared by her, say, four 
grandchildren living at the time she wrote the will, or to be shared by 
however many grandchildren are living at the time she dies (say 
five).237 Similarly, the term “any class of workers” can be understood 
as shorthand for whatever other transportation workers then came 
within Commerce Clause regulatory power, or it can be understood to 
mean whatever the Commerce Clause includes at the time of a 
subsequent dispute. While the law of wills establishes a presumptive 
preference for the latter interpretation, in statutory interpretation 
 
 233. 9 U.S.C. §	2 (2012). 
 234. §	1. 
 235. See Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 109. 
 236. Scalia and Garner describe the canon as follows: “Where general words follow an 
enumeration of two or more things, they apply only to persons or things of the same 
general kind or class specifically mentioned	.	.	.	.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, at 199. 
Although its applicability in particular cases may be disputed (as in Circuit City Stores), 
the principle is generally recognized as a legitimate canon of construction. 
 237. In the context of wills, the law presumes that a “class gift” was intended, unless 
context suggests otherwise, meaning that the second interpretation, in which the 
grandchildren alive at the time of the testator’s death inherit, prevails. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS §	13.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
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there is no such presumption, and ordinary tools of interpretation 
must be applied.238 
The majority and dissenting Justices clashed over several issues. 
First, they fought over a nuance in the different words used in 
sections 1 and 2. Section 2 applies to contracts “evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce,” while section 1 excludes contracts 
of employment for those “engaged in” commerce. In an earlier case, 
cited many times by both sides,239 the Court held that section 2 was 
intended to be construed broadly to encompass the limits of 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause. That is, arbitration 
under the FAA is favored to the full extent the Constitution permits. 
“Engage in,” the majority held, is narrower in scope than 
“evidencing,” suggesting that the exception to the rule was intended 
to be more constrained than is the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements under section 2.240 It is here that ejusdem generis241 comes 
into play, as the majority argues that the “other workers” referred to 
in the statute should be understood as being part of the same class of 
workers as those specifically mentioned: namely, transportation 
workers.242 The dissent acknowledged these arguments, but rejected 
them more or less out of hand.243 
Second, the Justices battled over history. The majority concerned 
itself with the fact that its position agreed with most circuit courts to 
have considered the question, the early history of the FAA (enacted 
to combat judicial hostility to arbitration), and Supreme Court 
 
 238. See Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992, 995–98 (2008), for a discussion of this same ambiguity 
in the context of interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act; see also Jill C. 
Anderson, Misreading Like a Lawyer: Cognitive Bias in Statutory Interpretation, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1522–27, 1574–75 (2014) (explaining by means of cognitive 
psychology the failure of courts to observe the ambiguity in many instances). See SOLAN, 
supra note 7, at 35–37, for further discussion of Circuit City Stores in the context of this 
ambiguity. 
 239. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995). 
 240. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 115–16 (citing Dobson, 513 U.S. at 277).   
 241. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “ejusdem generis” as  
[a] canon of construction holding that when a general word or phrase follows a list 
of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of 
the same class as those listed. For example, in the phrase horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, 
goats, or any other farm animals, the general language or any other farm animals—
despite its seeming breadth—would probably be held to include only four-legged, 
hoofed mammals typically found on farms, and thus would exclude chickens. 
Ejusdem generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 242. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 121 (citing Tractor Supply Co. v. Thoesen Tractor 
Equip. Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 243. Id. at 138–40 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1165 (2016) 
1208 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
precedent favoring arbitration.244 The dissent, in contrast, focused on 
the legislative history of section 1 (which the majority rejected as 
irrelevant, having found the language clear) and the earliest cases 
interpreting the provisions, which tended to favor the dissenting 
view.245 
Third, the Justices disagreed about how to determine the 
purpose of the statute. The majority cited the statute’s motivating 
policy of encouraging arbitration by overcoming courts’ hostility to 
alternative dispute resolution in 1925.246 The dissent instead focused 
on the protection of workers from a policy that would close the 
courthouse door to them.247 
Table 3 tallies the number of cases cited by each side (the two 
dissenting opinions are combined) to make these and related points. 
In all, the majority employed forty-four citations to case law, the 
dissent forty-one. 
 
 
 244. Id. at 111–12, 119–23 (majority opinion). 
 245. Id. at 125–31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 246. Id. at 111 (majority opinion). 
 247. See id. at 128–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Table 3—The Use of Precedent by Majority and Dissenting 
Opinions in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams 
 
Argument Majority Dissent 
1. The FAA does not apply 
to employment contracts. 1
248 2249 
2. Strong circuit court 
support for not all 
employment contracts being 
excluded from the FAA. 
9250 1251 
3. The FAA was a response 
to courts’ hostility toward 
arbitration. 
2252 0 
4. The FAA is preemptive 
of state law and applies in 
state courts. 
2253 0 
5. FAA enacted under 
Commerce Clause and 
interpreted to allow Congress 
to exercise its commerce 
power to the fullest extent. 
2254 0 
 
 248. Id. at 110 (majority opinion) (citing Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 
1094 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 249. Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 
U.S. 198, 200, 201 n.3 (1956)); id. at 130–31 (citing Textile Workers Union of Am. v. 
Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 466 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
 250. Id. at 110–11 (majority opinion) (first citing McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 
573, 575–76 (10th Cir. 1998); then citing O’Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 
(4th Cir. 1997); then citing Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997); 
then citing Cole v. Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1470–72 (D.C. Cir. 1997); then citing 
Rojas v. TK Commc’ns, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 747–48 (5th Cir. 1996); then citing Asplundh 
Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 596–601 (6th Cir. 1995); then citing Erving v. Va. 
Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); then citing Dickstein v. 
DuPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971); and then citing Tenney Eng’g, Inc. v. United 
Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953)). 
 251. Id. at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Tenney Eng’g, 207 F.2d at 452).  
 252. Id. at 111 (majority opinion) (first citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 
513 U.S. 265, 270–71 (1995); and then citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 
U.S. 20, 24 (1991)). 
 253. Id. at 122 (first citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984); and then 
citing Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272). 
 254. Id. at 112, 116 (first citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 
U.S. 395, 405 (1967); and then citing Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1165 (2016) 
1210 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
Argument Majority Dissent 
6. Exclusion is limited to 
transportation workers. 1
255 0 
7. Securities case is not 
relevant because not under a 
contract of employment. 
1256 0 
8. Employment contract not 
a contract evidencing 
commerce at all. 
1257 1258 
9. This would render 
section 1 superfluous, 
violating canon. 
1259 0 
10. Earlier cases have read 
section 2 expansively. 2
260 0 
11. Ejusdem generis applies. 1261 0 
12. Ejusdem generis does 
not apply. 0 6
262 
 
 
 
 
 
 255. Id. at 112 (citing Cole, 105 F.3d at 1471). 
 256. Id. at 113–14 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20). 
 257. Id. at 113 (citing Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 258. Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 
U.S. 198, 200, 201 n.3 (1956)). 
 259. Id. at 113–15 (majority opinion) (citing Pa. Dep’t of Welfare v. Davenport, 495 
U.S. 552, 562 (1990)). 
 260. Id. at 113–14 (first citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 
279–80 (1995); and then citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20). 
 261. Id. at 114–15 (citing Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U.S. 117, 129 
(1991)). 
 262. Id. at 138 n.2, (Souter, J., dissenting) (first citing Norfolk & W. Ry., 499 U.S. at 
129; then citing Fort Stewart Sch. v. FLRA, 495 U.S. 641, 646 (1990); then citing Garcia v. 
United States, 469 U.S. 70, 74–75 (1984); and then citing Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 
124, 128 (1936)); id. at 140 n.4 (citing Watt v. W. Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 44 n.5 (1983)). 
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Argument Majority Dissent 
13. “Engaged in commerce” 
compared with “evidencing 
commerce” or “used in 
commerce” or “in 
commerce.” 
8263 4264 
14. Cases beginning in 1937 
expanded Commerce Clause 
power. 
1265 0 
15. Employers’ Liability Act 
cases and other early cases 
showed narrow reach of 
Commerce Clause in 
employment. 
3266 0 
16. Argument from history 
does not expand Clayton 
Act’s scope beyond language.
1267 0 
17. Statutory provisions do 
not necessarily have uniform 
meaning. 
1268 0 
18. No abstract formula can 
answer extent to which 
Congress has exercised its 
Commerce Clause powers.
1269 0 
 
 
 263. Id. at 115–18 (majority opinion) (first citing Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 
855 (2000); then citing Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277; then citing United States v. Am. 
Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 279–80 (1975); then citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp 
Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186, 199–202 (1974); then citing FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 
U.S. 349, 350–51 (1941); then citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U.S. 473, 477–78 
(1914); then citing Second Emp’rs’ Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1912); and then citing 
Emp’rs’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 498 (1908)). 
 264. Id. at 135–36 (Souter, J., dissenting) (first citing Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273–74; 
then citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); then citing Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 
U.S. 251, 271–76 (1918); and then citing Emp’rs’ Liab. Cases, 207 U.S. at 496, 498). 
 265. Id. at 116 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 
(1995)). 
 266. Id. (first citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 233 U.S. at 477–78; then citing Second Emp’rs’ 
Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. at 48–49; and then citing Emp’rs’ Liab. Cases, 207 U.S. at 498). 
 267. Id. at 117 (citing Gulf Oil Corp., 419 U.S. at 202). 
 268. Id. at 118 (citing Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. at 277). 
 269. Id. (citing A.B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 520 (1942)). 
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Argument Majority Dissent 
19. Do not use legislative 
history where the meaning is 
clear—Court cannot expand 
statute’s reach based on 
history. 
2270 0 
20. Limiting section 1 to 
transportation workers is 
rational. 
1271 0 
21. Advantages of 
arbitration do not disappear 
in employment context. 
3272 0 
22. Antidiscrimination laws 
apply in arbitrations. 4
273 0 
23. View that only 
transportation workers were 
exempt under section 1 arose 
in a 1954 case and was 
rejected by other courts. 
0 2274 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 270. Id. at 119–20 (first citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994); and 
then citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 51 n.13 (1986)). 
 271. Id. at 121 (citing Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997)).  
 272. Id. at 122–23 (first citing Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 149 (2001); then citing 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275 (1995); and then citing 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 30–32 (1991)). 
 273. Id. at 123–24 (first citing Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 275; then quoting Gilmer, 500 
U.S. at 26; then citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 628 (1985); and then citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)). 
 274. Id. at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (first citing Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal 
Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 211, 224 (4th Cir. 1954); and then citing Tenney Eng’g, Inc. v. Elec. 
Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953)). 
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Argument Majority Dissent 
24. Earlier circuit courts 
were divided on whether 
collective bargaining 
agreements come within 
section 1. 
0 8275 
25. 1957 Supreme Court 
decision strongly implies 
support for proposition that 
section 1 applies generally to 
employment contracts. 
0 1276 
26. Broad Commerce 
Clause reading of section 2 
says nothing about how to 
construe section 1. 
0 5277 
27. Over time, a majority of 
Justices have supported the 
broader reading of section 1. 
0 2278 
 
 
 
 
 275. Id. at 129 nn.9–10 (first citing Miller Metal Prods., 215 F.2d at 224; then citing 
Elec. Workers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85, 100 (1st Cir. 1956), aff’d on other grounds, 
353 U.S. 547 (1957); then citing Lincoln Mills of Ala. v. Textile Workers, 230 F.2d 81, 86 
(5th Cir. 1956), rev’d on other grounds, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); then citing Hoover Motor 
Express Co., Inc. v. Teamsters, 217 F.2d 49, 53 (6th Cir. 1954); then citing Elec. Ry. & 
Motor Coach Emps. v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 1951); then 
citing Mercury Oil Ref. Co. v. Oil Workers, 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951); and then 
citing Shirley-Herman Co. v. Hod Carriers, 182 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1950)); id. at 129–30 
(citing Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876, 882 (6th Cir. 1944)). 
 276. Id. at 130 (citing Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957)). 
 277. Id. at 134 & n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting) (first citing Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. 265; then 
citing Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1086 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999); then citing 
Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1995); then citing Willis 
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311–12 (6th Cir. 1991); and then citing Gatliff 
Coal, 142 F.2d at 882). 
 278. Id. at 131 & n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (first citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 36, 38–41 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); and then citing Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 466–68 (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting)). 
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Argument Majority Dissent 
28. Strong proarbitration 
stance of Court has pushed 
interpretation. 
0 8279 
29. Statute should be read 
as a coherent whole. 0 1
280 
 
Note that, like Ledbetter and unlike Small, there is very little 
overlap in the citations adduced by each side. 
The three cases discussed precedent in overlapping ways, but 
there are also some interesting differences. Small was about both a 
semantic ambiguity that both sides acknowledged and the tension 
between the purpose of the statute (keeping guns away from 
convicted felons) and another legal doctrine—the doctrine that laws 
are generally not construed extraterritorially. Both sides in the debate 
recognized the issues, although they took opposite positions at the 
end of the day. The cases they cited reflected their preferences. 
Ledbetter contrasted reliance on a linguistic nuance (the ordinary 
way to use the verb “discriminate” is with respect to volitional acts of 
discrimination) with reliance on the purpose of the statute and the 
intent of Congress in enacting it, which would have been unlikely to 
provide a permanent safe harbor for employment discrimination to 
those employers who did not get caught discriminating until their 
employees learned that they were being treated differently. Thus, 
each side referred to entirely different sets of precedent as each 
attempted to create coherent narratives in which its position was the 
better fit. 
Finally, Circuit City Stores combined aspects of each of the other 
two cases. Both sides regarded the history of interpretation as 
important and used precedent to recite that history. Both sides also 
recognized that the Court had only recently read section 2 of the 
 
 279. Id. at 132 nn.14–15 (first citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20; then citing Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); then citing Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); then citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); then citing Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); then citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); then citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 
U.S. 395 (1967); and then citing O’Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 
1997)). 
 280. Id. at 137 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 
221 (1991)).  
94 N.C. L. REV. 1165 (2016) 
2016] STATUTES & PRECEDENT 1215 
FAA expansively to include the full range of cases permitted under 
the Commerce Clause. But the two sides differed on the nature of the 
historical narrative they wished this case to supplement.281 They 
further disagreed on which episodes in the interpretive history of 
these and related statutes they wished to emphasize. This resulted in 
some overlap in precedents cited, but also in a number of differences. 
Others have noted that the citation practices of individual judges 
track their political ideologies.282 This should not be surprising, since 
studies show that judges appointed by Democrats tend to make more 
liberal decisions than do those appointed by Republicans in cases 
concerning the validity of interpretations by administrative agencies, 
each side tending to support administrative decisions made by an 
administration of the same party that appointed the judge.283 The 
cases discussed above, however, show more than the Justices’ 
propensity to rule consistently with their political values. These cases 
show relative uniformity in placing precedent above serious inquiry 
into legislative intent as a value in statutory interpretation. Other 
than Ronald Dworkin284 (to whose work we return in the next Part of 
this Article), it is difficult to find judges and scholars who openly 
espouse such a priority. 
C. Textualization of Precedent and the Development of Common 
Law Statutes 
Approximately a decade ago in an important article, Peter 
Tiersma wrote of “the textualization of precedent.”285 This occurs 
when a court analyzes the language used by a prior court as though 
that language is a law.286 It is a significant part of today’s common law 
reasoning, at least in American courts.287 However, it is a departure 
 
 281. See DWORKIN, supra note 106, at 228–32 (likening statutory interpretation to 
writing the next chapter in a chain novel). I return to Dworkin’s metaphor at infra note 
338 and accompanying text. 
 282. See Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Friendly Precedent, 57 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2268707 [http://perma.cc/2DUX-LNSS]. 
 283. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825–27 (2006); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment 
of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1091 
(2008). 
 284. See DWORKIN, supra note 106, at 337–41. 
 285. Tiersma, supra note 30, at 1188. 
 286. Id. at 1243, 1247. 
 287. See, e.g., id. at 1247–62 (providing examples of how this textualization has 
occurred). 
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from classical common law analysis, in which the holding is 
considered to have precedential effect, but not the reasoning. 
When applying traditional common law analysis, lower courts are 
obliged, and higher courts are presumptively inclined, to follow the 
holdings of earlier cases. But, as Edward Levi noted in his classic 
introduction to legal reasoning, the distinction between holding and 
dicta forced judges to take responsibility for making their own 
decisions in subsequent cases.288 Thus, appellate judges traditionally 
justified their decisions with analogical reasoning rather than by 
virtue of rule-like general pronouncements—or at least they did so 
more than they do today. Now, however, many judicial holdings 
sound more like statutes than they do like individual holdings. 
Compare this statement by the Supreme Court of California: “[W]e 
hold that golfers have a limited duty of care to other players, 
breached only if they intentionally injure them or engage in conduct 
that is ‘so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary 
activity involved in the sport[;]’	”289 with this statement from the 
Supreme Court of Kansas: “We hold that Dan Borth assumed the risk 
of his employment as a matter of law.”290 The California court 
announced a rule of general application. The Kansas court decided a 
case. 
But statutory cases are different. The reduction of precedent into 
authoritative text promotes the development of what amounts to 
common law statutes. Courts take their earlier language and regard it 
as authoritative text,291 which, in turn, makes it desirable for a 
subsequent court to create a coherent body of law by elaborating on 
the language used by the earlier court. The result, almost of necessity, 
is a heavy emphasis on what judges wrote in prior cases interpreting a 
statute. I argue below that the practice is a good one when the reason 
for the textualization is respect for the merits of an earlier decision, 
but a bad one when precedent takes over as a justification for its own 
sake.  
Consider the following example. In 1976, Judge Henry Friendly 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
developed a hierarchy of inherent trademark strength under the 
 
 288. See LEVI, supra note 15, at 7–8. 
 289. Shin v. Ahn, 165 P.3d 581, 590 (Cal. 2007). 
 290. Borth v. Borth, 561 P.2d 408, 416 (Kan. 1977). 
 291. See generally Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682 (1995) 
(discussing this phenomenon in the context of constitutional adjudication). 
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Lanham Act, which governs U.S. trademark law.292 The Supreme 
Court has summarized Judge Friendly’s taxonomy as follows: 
In the context of word marks, courts have applied the now-
classic test originally formulated by Judge Friendly, in which 
word marks that are “arbitrary” (“Camel” cigarettes), 
“fanciful” (“Kodak” film), or “suggestive” (“Tide” laundry 
detergent) are held to be inherently distinctive.293 
These categories receive automatic trademark protection and are 
distinguished from the “generic,” which receive no trademark 
protection, and the “descriptive,” which are eligible for protection 
only after acquiring secondary meaning.294 Friendly did not make up 
these categories entirely. Some of Friendly’s language came from the 
common law of trademark, while other language came from the 
Lanham Act itself.295 Judge Friendly was comfortable with this 
partnership between the two branches of government: 
The cases, and in some instances the Lanham Act, identify four 
different categories of terms with respect to trademark 
protection. Arrayed in an ascending order which roughly 
reflects their eligibility to trademark status and the degree of 
protection accorded, these classes are (1) generic, (2) 
descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.296  
There was nothing radical about his opinion, which more or less 
summarized the case law of the time.297 But his taxonomy followed by 
the description of the meanings of these terms resonated with the 
community of trademark judges, lawyers, and scholars, and has lasted 
for some forty years—with no end in sight. His opinion has been cited 
in more than one thousand cases298 and is itself a central pillar of 
American trademark law.299 The Abercrombie categories (generic, 
 
 292. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 293. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000) (quoting 
Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 10–11). 
 294. See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9–11 (defining other categories). 
 295. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §	1052(e) (2012) (describing the ineligibility of descriptive 
marks for trademark protection). 
 296. Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9. 
 297. See id. at 9 (referring to prior case law as the basis of the categorization of 
trademark distinctiveness). 
 298. Shepard’s Citations reports 1060 case citations as of April 15, 2016. 
 299. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §	12:2 (4th ed. 2015); 1 CHARLES E. MCKENNEY & GEORGE F. LONG III, 
FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION: LANHAM ACT 43(a) §	3:3 (2015). 
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descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary and fanciful) have been used in 
close proximity to each other in over 1700 cases.300 
The case has stare decisis effect only in the Second Circuit. Thus, 
it should not be surprising that district courts within the Second 
Circuit refer to the case often, or that the Second Circuit itself refers 
to its earlier decision and has not overruled itself.301 The case’s 
influence, however, extends far beyond the Second Circuit. Not only 
has it been quoted by the Supreme Court, which has no obligation to 
refer to circuit court cases, but it has been widely cited by other courts 
of appeals.302 Without question, Judge Friendly’s characterization of 
trademarks is now fully textualized into American law. 
Compare Judge Friendly’s decision to the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of the word “pattern” in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell,303 a 
1989 case interpreting the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”). The Supreme Court was confronted 
with determining whether a small number of allegedly illegal acts 
conducted by a defendant as a single scheme to bribe officials 
constituted a “pattern of racketeering activity,”304 a prerequisite to 
finding RICO liability. A phone company in Minnesota had been 
bribing public officials to get favorable rates from regulators. When 
charged with a RICO violation, the company argued that it had 
engaged in only one illegal scheme and therefore had not engaged in 
a pattern, as the statute requires.305 The Court analyzed the language 
and determined that the offending conduct might constitute a pattern. 
A pattern, the Court held, requires both “continuity” and 
 
 300. Lexis search conducted April 15, 2016, in state and federal court databases 
(generic w/25 suggestive w/25 arbitrary w/25 fanciful). 
 301. See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 93–94 (2d 
Cir. 2001). 
 302. See, e.g., In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 41 (1st Cir. 2001); Ashley 
Furniture v. SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 1999); Windmill Corp. v. 
Kelly Foods Corp., Nos. 94-5874, 94-5890, 95-5137, 1996 WL 33251, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 26, 
1996) (unpublished table decision); Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 785 (8th 
Cir. 1995); Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Laredo, Tex. v. Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Austin, 
Tex., 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 
934, 937 (10th Cir. 1983); Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 
1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1979); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 
79 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 303. 492 U.S. 229 (1989). 
 304. 18 U.S.C. §	1961 (2012). 
 305. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 234. 
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“relatedness,”306 and it should be up to the trier of fact to determine 
whether these elements were present. 
Since then, courts have engaged in more than 300 analyses of 
“continuity” and “relatedness” to determine RICO liability.307 The 
word “pattern” is mentioned but has dropped out of the analysis. It is 
not easy to tell whether, in many cases, a reasonable person’s concept 
of a “pattern” would match up with what she might consider to have 
“relatedness” and “continuity.” In short, the Court created its own 
common law of RICO and acknowledged that it was doing so: 
The limits of the relationship and continuity concepts that 
combine to define a RICO pattern, and the precise methods by 
which relatedness and continuity or its threat may be proved, 
cannot be fixed in advance with such clarity that it will always 
be apparent whether in a particular case a “pattern of 
racketeering activity” exists. The development of these 
concepts must await future cases, absent a decision by Congress 
to revisit RICO to provide clearer guidance as to the Act’s 
intended scope.308 
I include both of these examples to demonstrate that 
textualization is itself neutral as to whether it creates order or chaos. 
When a court elaborates on statutory language that is not sufficiently 
clear to inform citizens of their rights and obligations, it benefits the 
legal system. When a court substitutes judicial language for that of the 
legislature without clarifying the law, it distorts the legislative output. 
In either case, by textualizing prior cases and then analyzing these 
texts as law, courts have taken a significant step in shifting the balance 
of lawmaking from the legislature to the judiciary, despite purporting 
to do just the opposite. 
III.  PRECEDENTIAL VALUES 
This Part discusses the values that appear to underlie the heavy 
reliance on precedent in statutory cases—especially a drive for 
coherence, which often takes priority over the professed value of 
legislative primacy in cases of statutory interpretation. The next Part 
suggests potential changes in judicial practice (and corresponding 
advocacy by lawyers). 
 
 306. Id. at 239 (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970) (statement of Senator 
McClellan)). 
 307. A Lexis search shows 106 circuit court opinions using “continuity” and 
“relatedness” in close proximity, and 634 district court cases doing so as of April 15, 2016. 
 308. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 243. 
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In citing each other, judges signal to readers that “this is 
something that has been said before.” When they cite multiple cases, 
they are signaling, “this is something that has been said over and over 
again.” Neither statement necessarily says anything about legislative 
primacy, the value associated with statutory interpretation that courts 
purport to follow. Rather, two values undergird the use of precedent 
in statutory cases: stability and coherence.309 By stability, I refer to 
traditional notions of stare decisis and obedience by lower courts to 
the holdings of higher courts, sometimes referred to as adherence to 
horizontal and vertical precedent, respectively.310 By coherence, I 
mean concern about the body of law governing a particular statute 
making sense as a whole and the body of law into which that statute 
fits making sense as a whole. When courts focus excessively on these 
values, they abdicate their responsibility to meet other important 
criteria, such as respect for legislative primacy, substantive rule of law 
values other than coherence, and concern about the consequences of 
their decisions. No wonder law students have difficulty moving past 
the citation of earlier cases to the strong substantive arguments 
needed to carry the day in close cases! 
Yet it would be too simple to complain that judges focus on these 
values solely as an atavism of their common law roots. The civil law 
also favors stability311 and coherence,312 but it expresses its respect for 
these values without such extensive citation of earlier judicial 
decisions. Thus, a better explanation might be that the use of 
precedent in statutory cases emanates from basic rule of law values 
that U.S. judges express in a common law style. If so, then it should 
not be surprising that judges assure themselves—perhaps through the 
citation of precedent—that their decisions are not causing the law to 
be unstable, incoherent, or incapable of standing up to valid 
argumentation to the contrary. 
Justice Scalia himself presented two reasons for judges to 
concern themselves with coherent decision-making in the realm of 
statutory interpretation. The first was that enacting legislatures have 
in the backs of their minds the need for new laws to make sense in the 
 
 309. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 311. See Zweigert & Puttfarken, supra note 12, at 716 (“Although the rule of stare 
decisis is not generally recognized in any civil law system, our courts’ attitude toward their 
own previous decisions is pretty much the same; and the higher a court, the greater will be 
its reluctance to overrule its own decisions.”). 
 312. See, e.g., ZIPPELIUS, supra note 8, at 61. See generally ALEKSANDER PECZENIK, 
ON LAW AND REASON (2008) (proposing a theory of legal reasoning in the civil law 
tradition with coherence as its centerpiece). 
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context of the larger legislative landscape into which they will be 
embedded: 
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be 
determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to 
have been understood by a larger handful of the Members of 
Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most 
in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely 
to have been understood by the whole Congress which voted on 
the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens subject to 
it), and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law 
into which the provision must be integrated—a compatibility 
which, by a benign fiction, we can assume Congress always has 
in mind.313 
This “benign fiction” may present itself in two different senses. 
The stronger sense is that in drafting laws the legislature specifically 
has in mind the current body of law and attempts to make the new 
law fit well within it. The weaker sense assumes that Congress 
generally, whether through carelessness or political expediency, 
enacts laws whose interpretations may be either marshaled into a 
coherent whole, or instead left to be applied inconsistently, and that 
the courts should assume that Congress prefers them to adopt the 
methodology that will make such laws coherent. For each version—
strong and weak—how benign the fiction is depends upon the extent 
to which members of Congress really do have this compatibility in 
mind. 
As for the strong version of Scalia’s legal fiction, it is likely to be 
somewhat elastic; true to some extent—especially with respect to 
immediately adjacent statutory provisions—and false to some 
extent—especially with respect to portions of a code remote from the 
provision being interpreted and even more so with respect to other 
regimes within the larger body of statutory law. 
Scalia and Bryan Garner have recognized these nuances,314 as has 
Professor Kent Greenawalt, who distinguishes between drawing 
inferences of coherence from different provisions in a single statute 
and drawing similar conclusions from statutes enacted at different 
 
 313. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 314. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, at 173 (“If [the statute being compared to the 
one whose interpretation is at issue in a case] was enacted at the same time, and dealt with 
the same subject, the argument could even be persuasive.”). 
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times and regulating different subject matter.315 Much of the case law 
applying Scalia’s “benign fiction,” however, does not. Rather, it 
engages in what Professor William Buzbee has called “the one 
Congress fiction,”316 in that it assumes that a single Congress wrote 
the laws being compared in a single, code-like manner. Relying on 
historical material that appears to reflect the intent of Congress, 
Buzbee argues that the coherence arguments applied by the Court in 
several cases tended to demonstrate an undermining of legislative 
primacy, rather than an enhancement of it.317 In other words, Scalia’s 
fiction was not benign.318 
Similarly, in their important empirical study, Professors Abbe 
Gluck and Lisa Bressman interviewed 137 congressional staff 
members about which judicial doctrines they take into account when 
drafting laws.319 Among them were the “whole act rule”320 and the 
“whole code rule.”321 The drafters claimed to be aware of these 
judicial doctrines but also claimed not to take them into account in 
their drafting activities simply because it is “impractical” for drafters 
to do so given the everyday rhythm of congressional work.322 
Now consider the weaker sense in which Scalia’s description of 
legislative intent may be accurate. Suppose that legislators do their 
best to be coherent but, under the circumstances, cannot make all 
laws consistent with each other either because of political realities 
 
 315. KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 27 
(2013). 
 316. Buzbee, supra note 112, at 179–80. 
 317. See id. at 180–203 (discussing, principally, Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); 
Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991); and FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)). 
 318. These are not the only problems with the rule’s applications. Even when the 
judges agree upon the nature of the principle, they argue about which parts of the statute 
to apply it in for particular cases and whether to extend out of a single statute into the 
remainder of the code. See Krishnakumar, supra note 27, at 970–71 for discussion. 
 319. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 31, at 905–06. 
 320. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (“In ascertaining the 
plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at 
issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.”); see also SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 5, at 167 (endorsing the use of this canon); Ross, supra note 85, at 
271–72 (recognizing the universality of the principle and criticizing it on grounds that it 
fails to reflect actual legislative practice). 
 321. For discussion of the whole code principle, which presumes coherence across the 
entire code, see Buzbee, supra note 112, at 221–25; Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory 
Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 
HASTINGS L.J. 221, 225–26 (2010); Widiss, supra note 225, at 874–75. Notably, Scalia and 
Garner express their reservations about the use of this interpretive strategy as well. 
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 5, at 172–73 
 322. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 31, at 954. 
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that limit fully coherent drafting or simply because, as with all laws, 
some of the circumstances in which the law will be applied are 
unforeseen at the time of enactment. Let us further assume that 
legislators, for the most part, understand that the courts are going to 
be left with the task of statutory interpretation and that they approve 
generally of judges caring about the laws being construed as mutually 
consistent. This perspective seems to be consistent with Gluck and 
Bressman’s findings. The staffers interviewed did not seem to object 
to canons that impose coherent interpretation. 
The weaker version of the coherence constraint on statutory 
interpretation assigns a lesser role to the legislature in setting the 
details of statutory law, because the generality of the legislature’s 
instructions to the courts leaves much up to the judiciary. One can see 
it in action when courts speak of the “general intent” of the 
legislature. Thus, in Moskal v. United States,323 the Supreme Court 
decided that a “falsely made” security included a document made to 
contain false information, even though, at the time the relevant 
statute was enacted, “falsely made” was synonymous with 
“counterfeit.”324 The statute in question criminalized the interstate 
trafficking of such documents.325 In support of its broad 
interpretation, the Court noted that this outcome was consistent with 
the statute’s “general intent” and “broad purpose,” which was to curb 
the kind of illegal activity at issue in the case at hand.326 That is, 
Congress would be satisfied with the Court’s construing the statute to 
create a coherent jurisprudence around the law’s general goals.327 
Such cases both call for coherence and define the value (legislative 
purpose) around which decisions should cohere. 
Let us now turn to Scalia’s second defense of coherence, which 
did not take the legislative will into account at all. He argued that 
judges, when given the choice, should opt for sense instead of 
nonsense in statutory interpretation: 
Where a statutory term presented to us for the first time is 
ambiguous, we construe it to contain that permissible meaning 
which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both 
 
 323. 498 U.S. 103 (1990). 
 324. Id. at 111. 
 325. 18 U.S.C. §	2314 (2012). 
 326. Moskal, 498 U.S. at 110. 
 327. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 496–97 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(relying on the “general intent” of welfare statutes to give broad construction to a statute 
providing certain benefits to children); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532 (1966) 
(examining the “general intent” of Congress in connection with the Patent Act). 
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previously and subsequently enacted law. We do so not because 
that precise accommodative meaning is what the lawmakers 
must have had in mind (how could an earlier Congress know 
what a later Congress would enact?), but because it is our role 
to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.328  
If we do not care what the legislature had in mind, then we must have 
some other reason for wanting to make sense out of the corpus juris. 
And, of course, we do. Whether or not the legislators had a coherent 
code in mind, the judges should care because the most basic rule of 
law values demand that a legal system make sense to the population 
that it governs. Recent empirical work by Tom Tyler and his 
colleagues supports this proposition by showing that people respond 
more positively to the legal system when they regard judges as having 
made decisions based on concerns that citizens regard as legitimate.329 
The case from which Scalia is quoted illustrates the tension 
between legislative primacy and coherence as its own value. In West 
Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey,330 the question was whether a 
civil rights statute awarding “a reasonable attorney’s fee”331 to a 
prevailing plaintiff included awarding the cost of expert fees. Scalia 
argued coherence on behalf of the majority.332 A number of federal 
statutes make reference to expert fees, suggesting that statutes 
intended to include expert fees as part of attorney fees need do so 
expressly.333 On the other hand, as the dissenting opinion pointed out, 
Congress enacted the statute to override a Supreme Court decision 
that appeared to Congress to be excessively stingy in permitting fee-
shifting. Accordingly, it would be surprising if Congress intended to 
exclude expert fees.334 The dissent had the last word when the statute 
was soon amended to include expert fees, overriding the Supreme 
Court a second time.335 
 
 328. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1991). 
 329. See, e.g., David B. Rottman & Tom R. Tyler, Thinking About Judges and Judicial 
Performance: Perspective of the Public and Court Users, 4 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 
1046, 1049 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2541450 [https://perma
.cc/5DSB-JP9U]. I thank William Eskridge for pointing out the importance of Tyler’s work 
in this regard.  
 330. 499 U.S. 83 (1991). 
 331. 42 U.S.C. §	1988(b) (2012). 
 332. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 101 (“[I]t is our role to make sense rather than 
nonsense out of the corpus juris.”). 
 333. Id. at 89–90. 
 334. Id. at 113 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 335. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1079 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-5(k)). 
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Coherence is deeply embedded in rule of law values, as many 
have noted. For example, Scott Shapiro bases his theory of “legality” 
on the relationship between lawmaking and interpreting on the one 
hand and “plan-making” and the execution of plans on the other.336 In 
developing this approach, Shapiro notes from the beginning that 
plans (and thus lawmaking) must be rational. He comments: 
“Rationality not only demands that we fill in our plans over time; it 
also counsels us to settle on plans of actions that are internally 
consistent and consistent with each other.”337 This rationality 
constraint applies generally, both to “bottom-up” planning—the stuff 
of common law reasoning—and “top-down” planning—the stuff of 
legislation. Returning to Scalia’s two justifications for judges 
concerning themselves with coherent interpretation when one 
interpretation of a law would make a provision incoherent with the 
larger body of law and the other would make it fit more rationally, it 
should be no surprise that judges choose the latter. This will be the 
case whether they assume that the enacting legislators would have 
wanted them to do so or, as institutional players, they have an 
independent obligation to prefer sense to nonsense in statutory 
interpretation—or both. 
Similarly, Ronald Dworkin’s notion of integrity in law surely 
incorporates coherence. Dworkin used the metaphor of each new 
interpretation of a statute being the equivalent of a new chapter in a 
chain novel.338 The interpretation must simultaneously advance the 
interpretation of the statute to cover (or not cover) new situations 
consistent with the highest values of the law and yet be mindful of the 
statute’s past, which includes everything from the societal situation 
that gave rise to its enactment, including the law’s legislative history, 
to the language of the statute itself and thus to subsequent 
interpretations by courts and other institutional actors. Moreover, 
Dworkin’s concept of law as integrity has coherence embedded in its 
core. For law to have integrity, it must be sufficiently coherent to 
treat similar situations alike.339 
Scholars writing in the civil law tradition also adduce coherence 
as an important value in decision-making. To a large extent, they also 
use precedent to demonstrate coherence, although they do so 
differently since civil law systems do not have stare decisis as a 
principle of binding law and cases are most often cited for their actual 
 
 336. SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 155 (2011). 
 337. Id. at 123. 
 338. See DWORKIN, supra note 106, at 228–38. 
 339. Id. at 219–24.  
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holdings.340 Regardless of the practice concerning citation of 
precedent, coherence is respected as a legal value in its own right, 
often under the rubric of “systematic interpretation.”341 Civil law, 
moreover, tends to adopt both Scalia’s weak legislative intent 
argument and his purely systemic argument. Quoting the nineteenth-
century German legal scholar F.K. von Savigny, Reinhold Zippelius 
notes: “	‘[O]nly when we are clear about what a statute’s relationship 
with the overall legal system is, and how the statute is to work within 
the system,’ can we understand the thoughts of the legislator.”342 He 
nonetheless further advocates for coherence as a value in its own 
right.343 And Aleksander Peczenik, a legal theorist writing largely in 
the civil law tradition, bases his entire theory of legal justification on 
the concept of coherence,344 linking coherence to rationality,345 as does 
Shapiro.346 
Coherence, though, is a necessary but not a sufficient basis for 
statutory interpretation. Things can be similar or different in all kinds 
of ways, only some of which are relevant to how a legal system should 
be structured.347 As the philosopher Nelson Goodman pointed out, we 
do not judge similarity by counting the features that two things have 
in common but rather by judging the overall importance of those 
properties that are shared. He continues: “But importance is a highly 
volatile matter, varying with every shift of context and interest, and 
quite incapable of supporting the fixed distinctions that philosophers 
so often seek to rest upon it.”348 
 
 340. See generally Robert S. Summers & Michele Taruffo, Interpretation and 
Comparative Analysis (examining the role of precedent in statutory interpretation in 
Western legal systems), in INTERPRETING STATUTES, supra note 11, at 461, 487–90. 
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Summers, Interpretation and Justification, in INTERPRETING STATUTES, supra note 11, at 
511, 513–14. 
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 343. Id. 
 344. See PECZENIK, supra note 312, at 131–32. 
 345. See id. at 160–76. 
 346. See SHAPIRO, supra note 336, at 156. 
 347. In addition, we judge similarity in varying ways, sometimes caring about whether 
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similarly related to each other. See, e.g., Robert L. Goldstone, Douglas L. Medin & Dedre 
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Judgments, 23 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 222, 248 (1991); see also Amos Tversky & Itamar 
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Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd eds., 1978) (accounting for similarity based on the number of 
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437, 444 (1972). 
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For Dworkin, the “important” values around which law should 
cohere are values that respect the rights of the population similarly at 
the level of abstraction at which those rights are best articulated.349 As 
Dworkin points out, a court with a coherent and consistent history of 
construing laws to grant minorities as few rights as possible within the 
confines of statutory language is indeed consistent and coherent, but 
is wrong-minded in some serious way.350 A coherent set of 
interpretations by definition must cohere around something, and 
respect for coherence without articulating what that something may 
be can lead a legal system to promote values that undermine the goals 
of the legislature. Once a court has developed precedents that value a 
particular set of principles, loyalty to those values may supersede 
loyalty to the value of legislative primacy, leading a court to elevate 
its own values over those of the enacting legislature. Because it 
accomplishes this through a means that receives little or no 
criticism—the citation of earlier judicial decisions—this strategy is 
likely to be successful—at least temporarily. Recall that this was 
precisely the criticism that the dissenting opinions offered in 
Ledbetter351 and Circuit City.352 Ledbetter was overridden by 
Congress.353 Yet the threat of override is a poor solution to the 
problem of judges placing their own values above those of the 
legislature in interpreting statutes. The possibility that disrespect for 
legislative intent can be repaired is a distant second to not 
disregarding the legislative will in the first place.354 
This point is driven home by an empirical study conducted by 
Professors Stephanie Lindquist and Frank Cross.355 In an initial study, 
Lindquist and Cross found that ideology played a significant role in 
appellate decisions where the court identified the case as one of “first 
impression.”356 They then examined a large number of cases decided 
by U.S. Courts of Appeals in which the question was whether a 
government official had acted “under color of state law” for purposes 
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of §	1983.357 Their study covered the period from 1961, when the 
Supreme Court decided the seminal case of Monroe v. Pape,358 
through 1990. Seven of the federal judicial circuits were included in 
the study. The goal was to determine whether the ideology of the 
circuit court judges played a diminishing role in the judges’ votes as 
both Supreme Court and circuit court precedent developed.  
The studies showed that precedent appeared to constrain judges 
for an initial period. Strikingly, as the amount of relevant precedent 
grew, its impact diminished and ideology came once again to the 
fore.359 Conservative judges began voting more conservatively, liberal 
judges more liberally. Apparently, as the opportunity to create 
various narratives increases, judges feel and act as though precedent 
constrains them less.360 To the extent that this is true, it reveals a 
serious problem with reliance on precedent in statutory cases, 
especially when the statute has generated a robust body of case law.361 
It suggests that the will of the judge increasingly supersedes the will of 
the legislature as the opportunity to do so expands by virtue of 
additional precedent. 
IV.  USING TRADITIONAL COMMON LAW VALUES TO ENCOURAGE 
RESTRAINT 
All of the forgoing suggests that courts should rely less on 
precedent in statutory decisions. The hard question is how and where 
the line should be drawn. It would be unwise to argue that judges 
should hesitate to adopt the excellent reasoning of a judge in a prior 
case, creating a common law for particular statutes through respect 
for earlier reasoning. Judge Friendly’s lasting impact on the language 
of trademark law illustrates the point well. Similarly, maintaining 
stare decisis as a matter of presumptively adhering to prior holdings—
both by lower courts and by high courts in their respective roles—is a 
practice worth keeping, subject to taking seriously issues of 
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continuing reliance and changes in social circumstances that led to the 
earlier decision.362 
Nonetheless, reliance on precedent to the extent that American 
courts engage in it is contrary to the stated goal of the courts to defer 
to the legislature in instances of statutory interpretation. If, as I have 
argued here,363 judges are often so embedded in a common law system 
that they cannot adequately stem their ardor for ruling on the basis of 
common law rather than statutory values, then it may be useful to 
look at the style of opinion writing in civil law jurisdictions where the 
detailed analysis of judicial decisions is less acceptable. Civil law 
judgments in statutory cases have two characteristics that may be 
instructive: they are short, and they do not generally make as much 
reference to case law.364 This is not to suggest that European judges 
are not aware of what courts within their jurisdictions have said or the 
basic principles of statutory interpretation. Rather, they write in a 
manner focused more on the legislature and less on themselves, 
taking seriously the civil law notion that judges do not make law.365 
They only interpret and apply the law that the legislature has 
enacted.366 
However, there are drawbacks to civil law interpretation as well. 
The cost of such an approach is a lack of transparency. It becomes 
easy to hide behind the illusion that statutory interpretation is a 
matter of applying agreed-upon tools to cases that can be definitively 
resolved. Moreover, as Peter Strauss points out so well, the 
differences in rhetoric about the degree of deference to the legislature 
between the civil law and common law approaches to statutory 
interpretation may be far more profound than differences in 
substance.367 While it may be worth investigating as a thought 
experiment, asking French judges to begin to sound like U.S. judges, 
or the converse, is unlikely to be a serious solution to the problems 
raised in this Article. 
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Thus, without pretending to have become civil law judges, 
common law judges should take far more seriously the question of 
whether and to what extent their reliance on earlier pronouncements 
by their own branch of government dominates the pronouncements of 
the legislative branch. I cannot propose a formula that will at once 
include all of the useful things that courts appropriately cite from 
earlier cases and exclude those that are more self-aggrandizing than 
intellectually valuable. Yet the core of such an approach should 
consider the difference between reasoning by analogy and adhering to 
precedent.368 As Schauer explains, the former requires that one 
establish the relevance of an earlier argument that one wishes to 
apply to a later case. The latter is a matter of obedience, even when 
one disagrees with the earlier decision or would not follow the 
reasoning that established the earlier precedent.369 I suggest below 
that many uses of precedent should require justification in each 
instance or should be dispensed with, while others (including 
horizontal stare decisis) may be applied simply because of their 
precedential status. 
An initial step for judges to take in approaching the question is 
to separate holding and dicta along traditional lines. Much has been 
written about the difficulty in sorting out just what was necessary to 
the decision in a case and what was peripheral, the traditional way in 
which holding and dicta are separated.370 Nonetheless, accepting that 
there will be line-drawing issues, using these concepts to sketch out 
constraining considerations for reliance on precedent in statutory 
interpretation may orient judges away from relying upon incidental 
statements by judges in cases not closely related to the case at hand. 
A thoughtful and thorough article by Michael Abramowicz and 
Maxwell Stearns on the varying and inconsistent uses of the 
holding/dicta distinction makes the following suggestion: 
A holding consists of those propositions along the chosen 
decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually 
decided, (2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to 
 
 368. For thoughtful discussion of the two methods of argument and their similarities 
and differences, see GREENAWALT, supra note 315, at 193–244. 
 369. See Schauer, supra note 37, at 125–27. 
 370. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 315, at 186–87; David Klein & Neal Devins, 
Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court Decision Making, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2021, 2048 (2013) (“Our evidence suggests that the distinction between 
holding and dictum is at once central to the American legal system and largely 
irrelevant.”); Kate O’Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair Use from the 
Right of First Publication, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 369, 372 (2001); Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta 
Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 223–24 (2010). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1165 (2016) 
2016] STATUTES & PRECEDENT 1231 
the judgment. If not a holding, a proposition stated in a case 
counts as dicta.371 
If, in a case concerning statutory interpretation, an earlier 
judicial decision meets all three criteria identified above, the court 
deciding the statutory case should be comfortable referring to the 
earlier decision for its precedential value. Because the definition is 
path-dependent, it is broad enough to include such procedural rulings 
as standards for summary judgment and standards for appellate 
review. It is also broad enough to include reasoning that led to the 
judgment based on analysis of the facts, such as Judge Friendly’s 
reasoning in Abercrombie & Fitch.372 However, it is not broad enough 
to include reference to cases that define ordinary words, cases that 
refer to canons, and cases that recite various historical narratives.  
As for other references to earlier decisions, these should depend 
on the extent to which they further such values as legislative primacy, 
coherence, stability, and legitimacy. Courts should refer to them only 
as persuasive and should take on the burden of explaining why they 
are persuasive with respect to these and other rule of law values. This 
should not be seen as a hard-and-fast rule, but rather as an attitudinal 
posture, the goal of which is to assist judges in focusing less on what 
the bench has said and more on what the legislature had in mind, or 
on other substantive issues. 
More specifically, I suggest that adoption of this approach would 
lead to the following: 
1. Statutory stare decisis remains as a principle of 
interpretation. Disputes about how broadly to construe earlier 
decisions are inevitable. Thus, cases like Flood v. Kuhn are 
justified on grounds of precedent.373 By the same token, courts 
should remain free to rely upon cases that announce established 
rules of procedure, such as standards of review, the overall 
operation of dispositive motions, and so on. While these 
discussions often seem to be boilerplate pronouncements, they 
typically reflect well-settled principles of procedure important 
to the rule of law. Yet, when there is legitimate disagreement 
about the breadth of earlier decisions, judges should be candid 
in acknowledging it, which in turn will force courts to produce 
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substantive arguments supporting the selection of one approach 
over the other. 
2. Courts should remain free to rely upon cases that articulate 
well-settled substantive canons of construction, including the 
rule of lenity and the rule that statutes are to be construed to 
avoid constitutional issues. The caveats stated above apply here 
as well. To the extent that there is reasonable debate about the 
applicability of a canon to the case at hand, the uncertainty 
should be acknowledged, and the position of the court (or 
dissent) should be argued for substantively—not as a matter of 
precedent. This may include the citation of earlier cases, but 
their relevance should be argued. Thus, using Small v. United 
States as an example, applying the rule that statutes are 
generally interpreted as regulating conduct within the 
territory374 would be justified only if the applicability of the 
canon was considered by the court in the light of countervailing 
considerations. In Small, the majority decision appears to have 
met that test. 
3. Coherence is at the heart of judicial decision-making. In 
construing statutes, judges should be comfortable using earlier 
holdings to demonstrate that the decision (or dissent) coheres 
with a particular version of the history of the statute’s 
enactment and interpretation, again, acknowledging and 
arguing against reasonable alternative narratives. Because the 
earlier precedents were not based on the facts of the case at 
hand, their applicability must be established through analogical 
reasoning. The competing histories in both Circuit City Stores 
and Ledbetter illustrate the need for such argumentation. 
Furthermore, coherence with historical narratives, such as 
reliance on legislative history or on the social or political 
circumstances that led to a law’s enactment, often need not be 
centered around judicial opinions at all. 
4. For the most part, the use of grammatical canons of 
construction should receive no precedential weight. Their 
application in any particular case should be defended on the 
merits—not by the bare fact that judges have used the canon in 
the past. The discussion of ejusdem generis in Circuit City 
Stores is a case in point.375 This is not to say that judges should 
not refer to the canons or to cases applying them. Rather, the 
application of a grammatical canon in a particular case should 
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be justified exclusively on the merits. Reliance upon earlier 
applications must be justified as sufficiently analogous. This 
position is similar to Judge Posner’s suggestion that the canons 
are to be seen as rules of thumb to be justified by practical 
reasoning in each instance.376 
5. Along these same linguistic lines, the meanings of ordinary 
words are not a matter of judicial precedent, and the use of a 
particular dictionary to define a statutory word in an earlier 
case has no status in subsequent decision-making. Thus, the 
various judicial pronouncements about the word “any” in Small 
have no place in judicial argumentation. 
6. Finally, all other kinds of asides about earlier judicial 
decisions found in the cases detailed in this Article should be 
shed from the judicial repertoire to shift the center of attention 
from judges to legislatures. 
These suggestions should help to shift the center of gravity in 
statutory decisions from the judiciary to the legislature. A focus on 
holdings should play an initial constraining role. The definitions of 
words in earlier cases are typically not based on the facts of the case; 
grammatical canons are almost never dispositive, and their use rarely 
engages the facts of a case. Other uses of precedent in decision-
making about statutory interpretation fit the definition of holding, but 
should be constrained as suggested in order to promote judicial 
integrity. 
CONCLUSION 
Examining various doctrines concerning statutory interpretation 
as a whole, this Article argues that, in combination, they amount to a 
judicio-centric approach to statutory interpretation, rhetoric to the 
contrary notwithstanding. Although this Article makes some concrete 
suggestions, it is difficult to be absolute about the distribution of 
appropriate and inappropriate categories for citation on a wholesale 
basis. Rather, this Article attempts to provide a framework based on 
the familiar holding/dicta distinction for judges to use in deciding 
whether an earlier decision should be given any force beyond 
whatever persuasive weight the judge can justify. Judges should ask 
themselves each time they are tempted to justify their decision by 
reference to what an earlier judge has pronounced how such citation 
advances the values that they intend to advance. That is, perhaps, a 
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good question for judges and scholars alike to ask themselves in any 
event. 
The proposals presented here are somewhat different from many 
that have preceded them. This Article does not call for the 
abandonment of the canons, for example.377 Rather, it calls for a shift 
from arguing from precedent to arguing by analogy—a shift that 
requires significantly more justification. This suggestion will not solve 
all of the problems of statutory interpretation, of course. Even in the 
cases discussed above, it is possible, within the framework presented 
here, to present cogent alternative narratives capable of furthering 
accepted values while providing sufficient analogy to past practice to 
be justified on grounds of coherence. Nonetheless, a serious reduction 
in the illusion of consistent past practice would lead the legal system 
toward a more candid and robust reliance on the legislative will as 
superseding the judicial will. And that is the principal stated goal of 
statutory interpretation, as practitioners of all political stripes agree. 
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